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61 Introduction
Since the end of the 1970s, privatization has become a significant, political economic
phenomenon on a global scale. Although transfer of assets between the state and private 
businesses has probably existed in some form or another for as long there have been 
ownership rights, the current trend of privatization is closely connected to globalization and 
the rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s. The total proceeds gained from privatization since 
1977 until 1998 amount to nearly two trillion USD in the world (Palcic and Reeves, 2010). 
Although the majority of the proceeds have accumulated in the West, privatization has also
been a prominent feature in reforming and restructuring the state-owned enterprise sector in 
East Asia. Three countries, China, Japan and South Korea have each been very active 
privatizers and their share of the privatization proceeds amount to over 400 billion USD (See 
Section 6.1; Proceeds from Privatization). 
In spite of the different economic histories, development paths and institutions in East Asia, 
privatization is an economic policy which has been adopted to a certain degree in each 
country. The purpose of this paper is to find out which similarities and differences China, 
Japan and Korea have shared in their approach to privatization. The research question of this 
thesis is three-part: which factors contributed to privatization, how was the process carried 
out and what were the results of privatization? I will identify the more specific details later 
on.
The method used in this study is the comparative method. In a comparative policy analysis, 
comparing privatization of state-owned enterprises in different countries falls into the 
category of process comparison or comparison of public policies. 
“It (the purpose) is not to describe and implicitly compare whole systems, but rather to 
develop lower-level comparisons of a particular institution or political process.” (Peters, 
1998:13)
These studies also tend to include comparisons across time and political systems (Ibid.,13, 
14) which is also reflected in this analysis in the different beginnings of privatization in East 
Asia. However, the public policy comparisons usually emphasize the processes and events 
themselves and do not take into account the circumstances in which the events unfold. (Ibid., 
1998:13) The scope of this analysis is more extensive. It also compares the types and forms 
7of privatization itself and the economic backgrounds, impetuses and results of privatization 
policies. 
This paper is organized followingly: in the second section, I will provide a short introduction 
to the conceptual framework which includes analytical tools for the comparison, the 
definitions, types and methods of privatization and the state-owned enterprises. In the 
subsequent chapter, I will go through the privatization process in each country. The purpose 
of the overview is to provide an adequate understanding of what changes have taken place in 
the East Asian public enterprise sector and how those transformations have folded out. 
Thereafter, in the fourth section, I will analyze and compare the more specific features of 
privatization in East Asia: the methods and dimensions of privatization as well the causes and 
results of privatization including economic development, business cycles, national debt, 
budget constraints, external influences, privatization proceeds and firm profitability. The 
findings and conclusions can be read in the fifth and sixth sections. 
2 Theoretical Framework: Defining and Explaining Privatization and 
State-Owned Enterprises
2.1 Historical Background
Roots of the late 20th century privatization can be traced back to the economic problems and 
subsequent rise of neoliberalism in the 1970s and early 1980s in the US and UK. According 
to David Harvey (2006), neoliberalism emerged in the west as an antithesis to the postwar 
consensus of state intervention, welfare state and policies of full employment.
The oil crises of the 1970s and persistent stagflation were viewed as failures of the Keynesian 
economic policies. The difficult economic situation forced private firms to streamline their 
activities and cut costs at the same time when governments were maintaining the Keynesian 
line of government spending and piling up deficits. It was against this background that public 
financial policies were condemned inefficient (Ibid., 2006; Shumpei, 1984). 
At the same time, governments increasingly found themselves surrounded by pressures to cut 
down on spending and debt. Attempts to curb government budget deficits led to demands to 
downsize state-owned enterprises (SOE), reduce their subsidies and harden their budget 
constraints. Some SOEs had been notorious for their bad management and inefficiency which 
provided further impetus to privatization. Privatization was hoped to create better incentives 
8for the managers and crowd out companies’ secondary functions which were not necessary 
for their vitality. There was also a desire to increase competition to sectors where SOEs had 
earlier been dominant. In addition privatization was also thought to help governments to raise 
revenue without indebting themselves or raising taxes (Chang, 2002).
Besides economic factors, the technological development and financial deregulation also 
affected the pace of privatization. For example, new technological innovations rendered some 
of the government monopolies obsolete such as telecommunications. On the financial front, 
internationalization of the financial markets increased the supply of capital. In order to gain 
access to this credit, companies had to become more profitable and their soft budget 
constraints harder (Ibid., 2007).
These policies became embodied with the Reagan and Thatcher administrations which 
initiated deregulation, privatization and reforms of public services to create growth and 
economic dynamism (Harvey, 2006). Neoliberal policies expanded their reach and impact 
toward the end of the 1980s in the developed world. Finally, as the Cold War ended, 
neoliberal policies gained global momentum when a large number of Eastern European and 
former Soviet Union states abandoned the plan economy and engaged in deregulation and 
mass privatizations (Chang, 2007; Shirley, 1998).
Despite the international nature of privatization and its impetuses, the process did not proceed 
identically in every country. Moreover, very few important companies and sectors were fully 
privatized. Instead of this, governments usually retained a certain amount of ownership 
(Chang, 2007). To sum up, neoliberal policies in general advocate minimization of state 
intervention, deregulation and privatization. Before moving on, the ontological nature of 
privatization has to be defined: what is privatization and what does privatization actually 
mean?
2.2 Definitions of Privatization
Privatization can be defined in a multitude of ways which are only slightly different from 
each other. In short, privatization can simply be described as the transfer of government1
ownership or property to private owners by asset sale (Investopedia: Privatization; 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung:Lexikon. Accessed on Oct 29th, 2011; Bortolotti, 
                                                            
1 I use the terms ‘government’ and ‘state’ as synonyms to each other in spite of their slightly different meanings.
9Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001)2. This definition is simple and easy to use to analyze instances 
of privatization but it is easily interpreted as a one-time phenomenon. Privatization is not 
conducted only once. It is a process carried out by authorized actors in a certain environment 
in certain ways using certain methods over a certain period of time. A slightly different and 
deeper definition of privatization can be found in the OECD Guidelines on SOEs: ‘As 
privatisation may be considered any material transaction by which the state’s ultimate 
ownership of corporate entities is reduced.’(OECD, 2010, pp.7) Hence, privatization does not 
necessarily imply a complete transfer of all government-owned assets to the private owners at 
once but a decreasing share of government ownership through selling state-assets to private 
investors. However, there are exceptions to this definition as will later be seen in the section 
methods of privatization.3 The antonym for privatization is nationalization which denotes 
takeover of private businesses by governments. They may or may not involve compensation 
to previous owners. Denationalization, on the other hand, often functions as a synonym for 
privatization (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia).
2.3 Economic Reforms and Privatization
Privatization is usually a result or part of larger economic reforms, where the government 
redefines its relations to the production and the economy at large. This is often undertaken 
through reforms and restructuring of the public corporate sector. Prior to privatizing an SOE, 
governments implement corporate reforms directed at their management, finances, debt and 
responsibilities to the state. Generally, these procedures include management incentives, 
financial freedom, loosening of regulations or replacing government control with supervision. 
Good examples are the economic reforms consolidated by the 12th the Central Committee of 
the Chinese Communist Party (Chow, 2007) and the 1983 GIE Administration Basic Act in 
Korea (Shirley, 1989).
                                                            
2 There are other, unrelated definitions too. Privatization can also refer to the transformation of a publicly traded 
and owned company to a privately owned entity which no longer trades on a stock exchange 
(Investopedia:Privatization. Accessed on Aug 25th, 2011).
3 There have been instances when assets have been shared to citizens instead of selling them.  See voucher 
privatization. 
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2.4 Dimensions of Privatization
To analyze the privatization experiences in East Asia, I have identified three opposite
dimensions of privatization; the first two are from the 2003 (pp.11-13) and the third 
dimension from the 2010 OECD report on privatization (pp.26).
2.4.1 Program and Ad hoc Privatization 
Governments may devise a specific program to carry out the privatization or privatize their 
assets based on temporary needs and improvisation. Where the to-be privatized companies 
are small and few, the improvised ad hoc approach tends to be applied and vice versa.
2.4.2 Centralized and Decentralized Privatization
Centralized privatization is a process dictated and managed by the central government or its 
ministries whereas decentralized or local privatization refers to a form of privatization where 
the most important decisions are carried out by local governments. According to the 2003 
OECD report, centralized privatization can be conducted through ‘(a) a unit within a 
financial ministry or a central agency of the government; (b) a dedicated privatisation body; 
(c) a holding company of the government’(OECD 2003, pp.13). There also exists a mixed 
approach which usually reflects a large number of diverse assets owned by the state.
2.4.3 Rapid and Gradual Privatization
Rapid and gradual or partial privatization reflects the speed of privatization and usually 
depends on the size of the company to be privatized. The smaller a company, the quicker it 
can be privatized. However, there are notorious examples of rapid privatization. The 
overnight privatizations of state assets in Russia are a prime example. In addition, there are 
two partialities: one adheres to a single company and whether the government is selling parts 
of it and how fast the process is carried out. The other refers to all state-owned shares and 
whether the government in question gradually privatizes parts of them all or only from a 
selected group of few companies.
However, only few governments have resorted to rapid privatization. Also, these concepts of 
rapid and gradual privatization are only approximations. Countries tend to apply a mixed 
approach to privatization. Also, these concepts are less concrete than the other two: the 
centralized and decentralized privatization and program and ad hoc privatization.
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In addition to the dimensions of privatization, I will also analyze privatization by comparing 
the methods used in privatization. The following section lists the most common types used in 
selling public assets to private investors.
2.5 Methods of Privatization
2.5.1 Share Issue Privatization 
Share issue privatization (SIP) is carried out by corporatizing4 SOEs into joint-stock 
companies whose shares can be publicly traded on the stock market (Megginson, Nash, 
Netter and Poulsen, 2001:2). SIP is the most prevalent type of privatization in the world due 
to its effectiveness in accumulating capital (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999) and its 
contribution to the build-up of domestic financial markets, (Subrahmanyam and Titman, 
1999). Often, SIP is the only alternative to privatize very large SOEs whose market value can 
be too high for any one single buyer to acquire (Megginson and Netter, 2001:19).
2.5.2 Direct Sale
In direct sale privatization, assets are sold directly to insiders such as managers or employees. 
In these cases, the method of direct sale is called manager buyout or employee shareholding, 
respectively. Alternatively, companies can also be sold to outsiders like private companies or 
to several investors through an auction without much publicity or a mediating institution like
a stock exchange (Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen.2001:2). This method has mainly 
been used in former communist countries (Jones, Megginson, Nash, and Netter, 1999:2).
2.5.3 Leasing
Privatization through leasing (contracting out) occurs when the government transfers some of 
its task like garbage collection to private parties. Leasing does not usually entail private 
actors buying state property which is why some authors do not consider leasing a real form of 
privatization because there is no transfer of assets from state to private actor (Ramanadhan, 
1993:248). 
                                                            
4 Corporatization implies transforming of the structure of SOEs or government departments into an enterprise 
structure found in publicly traded companies. Corporatization does not imply the government divesting its 
ownership. (Investopedia: Corporatization)
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2.5.4 Privatization from below
In comparison to the other types of privatization, privatization from below is the most 
distinctive form of privatization as there is no ownership changes but the emergence of 
private businesses. Privatization from below mainly applies to transitional economies where 
restrictions, bans and obstacles to opening a business or market entry have been removed or 
eased (Naughton, 1994:266) but it could also be applied to developed economies where 
removal of creation of standards and regulations by the state, deregulation, is taking place 
(Gormley, 1996 and 1997). Privatization from below is also known as spontaneous 
privatization as opposed to calculated and planned privatization from above or centrally 
directed privatization (Zhiyuan Cui, 2001).
2.5.5 Other Forms of Privatization
In addition the abovementioned, privatization can be carried out in other ways as well. 
However, I will not include these forms into the analysis of privatization in East Asia because 
of their much less usual occurrence in the privatization of SOEs. 
Voucher privatization is essentially the same as SIP with the exception that the vouchers 
(shares) are distributed by the state for free or for a low, nominal fee to all citizens. This type 
of privatization was mainly adopted in the post-plan-economy countries like Russia and 
Eastern Europe (Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen.2001:2). Elimination of a public 
function occurs when the tasks and duties traditionally taken care of by the state are 
transferred to the private sector without government divesting (Bendick, 1989). Privatization 
can also take the form of franchising, where the private sector applies a government-
approved model of providing goods and services, or contracting, where the government pays 
the private sector for producing and delivering certain goods and services (Kamerman and 
Kahn, 1998).
2.6 Determinants of Privatization
Apart from analyzing privatization itself and how it has unfolded, I will also look at the 
factors and impetuses for privatization. In short, I will explore the causal and structural 
mechanisms behind privatization and seek to understand their role in the East Asian 
privatization. 
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According to Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2004 and 2001), commonplace factors which 
either cause and correlate with privatization include economic development, government 
budget constraints, financial markets, business cycles, political majorities, legal origin, 
political institutions, concerns for efficiency and public debt. For the analytical purposes of 
this paper, I have chosen four parameters to analyze the causes of privatization with: 
economic development, public debt, business cycles and budget constraints. In addition to 
these, I have also added a parameter of my own: external influences. 
The intention of measuring level of economic development as a ratio of GDP per capita is to 
compare the initial level of GDP with the first privatizations. The purpose is to explore 
whether privatization is actually linked to a particular level of economic development in East 
Asia or whether it is a feature of the current global economic order.
High public debt correlates with privatization. The purpose in this paper is to find out 
whether the levels of debt in China, Japan and Korea remove a domestic, political threshold 
to privatization or whether surpassing that threshold is universal. 
Economic growth tends to increase the value of assets making it more attractive to the owner 
of these assets to sell them. I seek to find out whether incidents of privatization have
increased during times of expanding economy or whether the timing of privatization has been 
indifferent to the fluctuations in the economy in East Asia.
As a fourth factor influencing privatization, budget constraints are analyzed and broken into 
their constituent parts to form a comparative understanding of these factors in each country. 
Which budget constraints have contributed to privatization in East Asia?  
The final factor is formed by external influences which I have added into the analysis to see 
whether privatization decisions are influenced by external actors or factors and to what extent 
this influence has realized.
Apart from analyzing the factors behind privatization determinants of privatization, this paper 
also looks into the results of privatization, although less extensively. The results of 
privatization are usually much more similar than the political imperatives leading to 
privatization. The results of privatization are constituted by comparing the post-privatization 
profitability of SOEs and revenue the governments have raised from privatization. 
14
2.7 State-Owned Enterprises
The objective of privatization is the transfer of state-owned assets to private actors but what
exactly are state-owned assets? Simply put, state-owned assets can be anything: land, real 
estate, precious metals or, as in the case of this paper, companies. The most commonplace 
name for these companies are SOEs but they are also known as public enterprises (PE)
(Lim), public corporations (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2010)5, government-owned corporations 
(Investopedia: State-Owned Enterprise) or government enterprises (Shirley, 1989). I will use 
these terms interchangeably giving priority to the common terms used in China, Japan and 
Korea. In the English speaking academic literature on the Chinese political economy, the 
most common term for government-owned companies is an SOE, whereas in the 
corresponding literature on Japan and Korea, a more common term is a PE. 
All these terms have a common denominator: a business entity which is entirely or partly 
owned by the state. Although this definition applies to all SOEs, not all companies with 
government shareholders can be accurately called SOEs. The ownership structures can be 
various, for example, a government can own shares of foreign companies or government-
owned investment vehicles like sovereign wealth funds may acquire foreign stocks. Lacking 
any precise definition of an archetypal SOE, the best example of an SOE, in my opinion, is a 
strategically important government monopoly, possibly established by or at some point 
nationalized by the state. 
2.7.1 Strategic Industries
Governments around the world own all kinds of companies but they tend to have close 
connections to certain industries. Key or strategic industries are industries which provide vital 
and important contributions to the national economy or security. (OECD, 1991) This is not a 
straightforward definition since economic importance is defined differently by different 
countries. In fact, it is such an ambiguous term that: “They (observers) know a strategic 
industry when they see one.” (OECD, 1991:36) Industries which usually fall into this 
category are technology, industry and trade (OECD, 1991:54). However, a company deemed 
important to the national welfare is not necessarily an SOE but a company with a special 
relationship with a ministry or other government department. The Japanese keiretsus or 
                                                            
5Public companies are companies whose shares are publicly traded on the stock exchange. (Investopedia, 2010: 
Public Company)
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Korean chaebols are good examples. In addition, governments may also own companies from 
none of the industries mentioned but aim to protect national health through ownership of 
alcohol retailers and pharmacies (Cisneros Örnberg and Ólafsdóttir, 2008; Neroth, 2005).  
2.7.2 Rationale for State-Owned Enterprises
Despite heavy privatization in some countries like UK, SOEs still occupy an important space 
in national economies around the world. Internationally, SOEs still occupy an important 
space in national economies. Some of the economic and political advantages provided by 
SOEs include natural monopolies, capital market failures, production of externalities and 
provision of equal access to products and services (Chang, 2007). 
In certain industries, due to technological obstacles and economies of scale, it is only possible 
for one or very few providers of goods and services to exist. Utilities and transportation are
often mentioned as examples of natural monopolies. Privatizing these sectors depends on the 
size and development of the markets and often raises political disputes.
Private actors can also be risk-averse in crediting high-risk companies. An example of capital 
market failure is a situation where private bank or private creditors are unwilling or unable to 
credit long-term or risky ventures which yield long-term profits.
Finally, companies operating in the free markets tend to focus on the most profitable 
activities at the cost of less rewarding businesses. This market mechanism might discourage 
them from providing goods and services to people unable to attain them for some reason like 
geographical obstacles, lack of money. In addition, private enterprises are self-oriented and 
avoid benefiting competitors or producing externalities.
2.7.3 Problems with State-Owned Enterprises
Contrary to the advantages SOEs provide, they also suffer from certain problems. For 
instance, SOEs are susceptible to a principal-agent problem when the policies pursued by the 
government contradict the interests of an SOE or when there are not enough incentives for 
the SOE to perform as wished by the state. If the performance of duties imposed by the state 
is difficult to monitor due to asymmetric information, there is an incentive for the SOE to 
abandon the task. (Investopedia: Principal-Agent Problem; Chang, 2007:14, 16)
In state-led economies, SOEs tend to enjoy unchecked government support, especially in 
form of financial resources. When firms’ spending is not constrained or they have soft budget 
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constraints, they are likely to have poor performance and low profitability (Kornai, Maskin 
and Roland, 2003). 
SOEs tend to be large and bureaucratic entities. Their management positions can be used as 
political rewards which are passed on between the members of the ruling elite. Due to the 
close political connections, SOEs can also be sources of corruption (Chang, 2007). 
2.8 Conclusion 
To sum up, privatization denotes any transfer of state property to non-public actors. To 
analyze and compare this process in East Asia, I have identified four analytical tools in this 
chapter: causes of privatization, dimensions of privatization, and methods of privatization and 
outcomes of privatization. The first category includes five causes of privatization: economic 
development, public debt, business cycles, budget constraints and external influences. The set 
of methods includes four main forms of privatization; SIP, direct sale, leasing and 
privatization from below. In addition, privatization will also be analyzed whether it has been 
centralized or decentralized, rapid or gradual and whether countries have devised a program 
or agency or an improvised approach to privatization. Finally, the effects of privatizations as 
proceeds from privatization and profitability of companies will be discussed and analyzed.
Before moving on to comparing privatization experiences in East Asia, I will provide a brief 
history and overview of privatization in China, Japan and South Korea in the next chapter.
3 Privatization in East Asia
3.1 Key Changes in the East Asian Public Enterprise Sector
3.1.1 China
The number of state-owned companies remained at slightly more than 80 thousand in 1980. 
Since 1998, the number was at 64 thousand and, by 2001, it has decreased to around 46 
thousand. The rapid decrease of companies also occurred in collectives which numbered  
more than 300 thousand in 1997. In 2001, their number had dropped to 31 thousand  
(Jefferson, Su, Jiang and Yu, 2003).  In terms of production, the output of the SOEs in 
relation to the GDP has fallen from 80% in 1978 to around one fifth of the GDP in 2003. In 
spite of this, the sector has grown in absolute figures but not as fast as the collective and 
private sector. However, the state still owns significant shares of companies which are 
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traditionally considered private. Also, in terms of labor and certain key industries and sectors, 
their dominance has decreased but still remains strong. After the growth of employment until 
the mid-1990s, the number of workers employed by the SOEs has since halved from around 
75 million in the mid-1980s to approximately 30 million in 2004. Regarding industrial 
entities, the SOE sector owned 57% of industrial assets. Since the mid-1990s, the majority of 
the SOEs are now largely in the ownership of local governments while the central 
government exerts control over 150 or so biggest SOEs. In addition to the reduction of state 
holdings through selling, the legislation adhering to the SOEs has also been constantly 
changed. SOEs have been merged and allowed to go bankrupt. (The McKinsey Quarterly, 
2004: The McKinsey Quarterly, 2008: Naughton, 2007:106)
3.1.2 Japan
After the war, the share of the Japanese public sector enterprises of the GDP has been 
miniscule when compared to other developed economies. Due to this, the Japanese public 
sector companies have experiences the least changes. The overall number of SOEs has 
remained more or less the same. In 2003, the total number of SOEs stood at around 80 
(OECD, 2003).If the privatization of TEPCO is excluded, there has been only one full 
privatization in the recent times: the privatization of JAL in 1987, an airline company which 
the state owned only partially. The privatizations of JNR, JT and NTT have been going on for 
nearly 25 years now but the process has been slow and privatization only partial. Perhaps, the 
reason to the slow privatization has been the traditionally less important role of SOEs in the 
economy.  
In the 1970s, the Japanese public sector companies produced only 5% of the GDP and 10% of 
gross domestic fixed capital formation. At the same time, the public sector employed only 5% 
of the work force (Cheung 2002; Young 1987:192; Toyama 1987:11). Due to the 
unavailability of statistical information on the number of employees of SOEs before the 
1990s, it is hard to present any precise figures. Despite this, there is a good reason to assume 
that the number of workers employed by SOEs has been presumably much lower than the 
total number of public sector employment. For instance, in the beginning of the 1990s, the 
workforce employed by the public sector stood at 3.5%, of which the share of the SOEs was a 
mere 0.1% (DPADM & DESA UNPAN, 2006).   
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3.1.3 Korea
Similarly to the Japanese public sector enterprises, the Korean PEs only produced a small 
part of the GDP and investments but, unlike in Japan, they had been reserved for 
experimental purposes in Korean industrialization plan. Privatization was started in the end of 
the 1970s. Since then, the pace of privatization has accelerated and slowed down but has 
always maintained its use as a policy choice. Although the exact number is difficult to assess, 
Korea has privatized fully or partially approximately over one hundred enterprises between 
1968 and 2008, including PEs, GIEs and GBEs. For example, Shirley (1989) estimates that 
there were around 90 PEs in Korea: 26 GIEs and 54 subsidiaries of GIEs plus certain 
government departments. By 2003, the number has dropped to 23 SOEs which are subject to 
further privatizations (Lim, Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Korea: Lessons for 
Developing Countries, Table 2 pp. 22-23). The total number of government owned 
corporations stood at 22 in 2010 (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, 2010). A 2011 OECD 
report on the changes in the SOE governance puts the number at 21 of which eight are purely 
commercial and 13 semi-commercial (OECD, 2011).  
Because privatization has been relatively consistent, the importance of the public sector 
enterprises has declined in a similar manner. In the mid-1960s, the PE produced 5.5% of the 
GDP and, a decade later, 6.3%. However, their share of the output of manufacturing during 
the same period of time stood at around 15% (Schmitz, 1996). In 1986, the GDP share of the 
PEs was 10.4%, (Shirley, 1989), a number which decreased to slightly more than three per 
cent in 1998 and slightly more than 2.5% in 2003 (OECD, 2003). Although the PEs had not 
been very important employers, the declining importance of PEs is also evident in terms of 
employment. In 20 years, the number employed by PEs was reduced from 1.5% in 1982 to 
0.5% in 2000 (Shirley, 1989; DPADM & DESA, 2007). This development has continued and 
the percentage of people employed by SOEs in 2009 stood at 0.33% (OECD, 2011).
3.1.4 Conclusion
To sum up, privatization has reduced the number of SOEs and state-owned holdings in East 
Asia, albeit to a very different degree. In comparison, the biggest absolute changes in terms 
of number of SOEs, their GDP and labor share have taken place in China but the percentage 
of assets owned and controlled by the state and local levels still remains much higher than in 
both Japan and Korea. In relative terms, Korean PEs have experienced a fourfold decrease in 
their share of the GDP; From the peak of 10.4% in the 1980s to 2.5% in 2003. Similarly, their 
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share of labor dropped from 1.5% in 1982 to 0.5% in 2000. In absolute terms, Japan has 
experienced the least changes. 
3.2 Public Enterprise Types in East Asia
There are definite differences when it comes to categorizing and defining an SOE in East 
Asia. Despite the differences in their relation to the government and public administration, 
state-owned-, public or government enterprise are the most common terms used in this paper 
but a different version might as well be used if it is considered necessary. 
3.2.1 China
Almost all large Chinese companies have had a past of state ownership and, still, very few of 
them are fully private. Because of this background, there are four types of Chinese 
corporations. The first group is formed by large, listed SOEs which have offered a small 
amount of their shares to the public. The companies in this group also tend to be monopolies 
or in sector with little competition. Domestic foreign joint ventures are in the second 
category. They provide new technology in order to enter the markets. The third group is 
composed of largely private companies in sectors with little or no SOEs. Finally, the fourth 
category of companies is those companies which are funded through a mix of public and
private money (The Economist, 2011 citing McKinsey and Infinity Group). 
3.2.2 Japan
The Japanese PE sector has traditionally consisted of four types of companies of which three 
are important from the viewpoint of privatization: The first category includes governmental 
departments which belong to their corresponding ministries. These types of enterprises 
include the National Forestry Service, Mint Bureau, Printing Bureau and Postal Services. 
From the viewpoint of privatization, the bureau of Postal Services is the most important. The 
second category, the government-controlled companies, is the most important one. This 
category is comprised of public corporations governed by the same commercial laws which 
adhere to private companies. Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and Japan Tobacco 
(JT), as partially privatized companies, belong to this group. The third category includes 
statutory companies which operate under specific laws. These companies also tend to be non-
commercial. The fourth category is comprised by autonomous bodies which are founded on 
government decisions (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2006; ASOSAI, Accountability and Control of
Public Enterprise, Japan, 1988).
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3.2.3 Korea
Korean economy is dominated by the large Korean conglomerates, chaebols, which form a 
single, large entity or company groups. They are operated and, usually, owned by powerful 
families (Investopedia: Chaebol Structure). In addition to the chaebols, there are also 
independent firms and PEs. 
There are three types of PEs in Korea: The first type is formed by government enterprises of 
which there are four: the Korean National Railroad, the Post Office, the Public Procurement 
Service and the Grain Management Enterprise. The government enterprises are governmental 
departments and are/were wholly-owned by the state. The second type of companies is public 
corporations. They are judicially separate entities from the state and enjoy more freedoms 
than the government enterprises. Despite their flexibility, the ultimate ownership remains 
within the state, although the piecemeal privatization of the public corporations has obscured 
the definitions between public and joint-stock corporations. The third corporation form is that 
of a joint-stock company. These companies are judicially governed as dictated by the 
commercial laws. The government’s authority in these companies is of limited 
liability/limited by its ownership of shares. The public corporations and joint-stock 
companies subsequently fall into three categories: Government-invested (GIE)6, 
Government-backed (GBE)7 and Indirectly Invested Enterprises (IIE8) which are subsidiaries 
of either GIEs or GBEs (Lim; Shirley, 1989). 
3.3 Overview of Privatization in China
The structural adjustment to a more market-based economy driven by the economic reforms 
has been the dominant determinant of the privatization process in China. Although 
privatization has not been embraced by the government, the state’s assets have nevertheless 
been reduced and SOEs have been turned private but at a slow and partial pace, balancing 
between the old and new system. Moreover, the central government and its localities have 
often retained a controlling interest in important SOEs. The privatization of the most 
important SOEs has been influenced by the emergence of market institutions and agencies; 
economic infrastructure which China lacked in the early phase of the reforms. Because of the 
                                                            
6 Also called government-invested institutions (GII) (Knowledge Sharing Program 2010)
7 Also called government-contributed enterprises (GCE) (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010) 
8 Also called subsidiary company of the GIEs (SCGIE) (Shirley 1989:5)
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transitional nature of China’s privatization, this section deals mostly with reforms and the 
emergence of institutions and regulations.
3.3.1 Initial Reforms
The initial reforms were characterized by a focus on agriculture and industry (Naughton, 
2007). Unlike Russia and many other post-Soviet states which implemented drastic measures 
to change the plan to a free market economy, Beijing started reducing the assets of its 
companies gradually and slowly (Sachs and Woo, 1994). 
In contrast to agriculture where political supervision and the role of collectives were quickly 
minimized and where peasants and farmers were given substantial freedom to affect their 
own income through contracting land, the full privatization of SOEs or land was not a 
political goal at the time (Chow, 2007; Sachs and Woo, 1994). Furthermore, full-scale 
privatization would have been much more difficult than freeing the farmers from the 
collectives due to four reasons: first, there was an ideological desire for the communist state 
to own and control the means of production. Second, strong economic interests and power 
vested in the SOEs by Chinese government officials would have made the process 
unproductive and politically unfeasible. Third, privatization of SOEs would have required 
more extensive reforms in other parts of the system such as pricing and distribution which 
were unalterable at the time. Fourth, the management skills and traditions were so outdated 
that they would have been incompatible with the requirements of modern enterprises (Chow, 
2007).
The first experiments in SOEs were started in six pilot enterprises in 1978 after which the 
number of experimental companies rapidly grew to cover 80% of all industrial SOEs in 1981. 
The general idea was to reward productivity within firms, rationalize the administrative 
system for SOEs and encourage foundation of collectively owned enterprises (Ibid., 2007).
Although the reforms were rapidly adopted, it was not until 1984 when the 12th Central 
Committee of the CCP consolidated and supported them. Enterprises were officially given 
autonomy in production, supply, marketing, pricing, investment and personnel in order to 
become profit-seeking units. Active state planning was reduced to guidance planning. Firms’ 
budgets were hardened and more flexible wages were introduced. In addition, foundation of 
individual and collective firms was supported (Ibid., 2007). Corporate governance was also 
reformed. Managers were made responsible for sales, profitability and investments but they 
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also became able to receive rewards for profitable actions. The increasing competition from 
township and village Enterprises (TVE) and the inflexibility of the SOEs to respond to the 
rivalry were among the reasons behind the reforms (Garnaut, Song and Yao, 2006).
3.3.2 Township and Village Enterprises
The emergence of TVEs was an important contributor to economic growth and dynamism in 
the 1980s. They were, as collectively owned entities, funded by local governments, credit 
cooperatives or subcontracted by SOEs. They were not part of the plan economy nor were 
they private. Despite their blurred ownership, they were able to compete efficiently with the 
SOEs what was one reason behind reforms in the SOE sector. The TVEs did not have the 
social liabilities of the SOEs and they could take advantage of the surplus labor freed from 
the agriculture as a result of decollectivization. The latter factor also contributed to their 
significant role in driving China’s exports and attracting foreign investments. TVEs were 
among the very first companies which were fully privatized in the mid-1990s. Encouraged by 
the local government and allowed by the central government, many TVEs were sold to their 
managers who were often themselves local government officials (Naughton, 2007: 301-302; 
Politics in China, 2010:199-200).
3.3.3 Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
The opening of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges also marked a new era in the 
Chinese reforms. SOEs were now able, with a special permission, to access a new source of 
financing and become less dependent on the plan and associated subsidies.
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) started operating at the end of 1990 and, since then, it 
has grown to be the largest stock exchange in China. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) 
started its operations in 1991. There were a total of 10 companies listed in the SSE in 1991 
and the number has grown every year except 2005. At the end of 2010 there were 894 
companies which had listed in the SSE offering 938 listed stocks. In the same year, the SZSE 
had 1021 listed companies comprising market capitalization worth of 828.7 billion USD. 
Both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange are overseen and regulated by the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2010, 2011).
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3.3.4 Restrictions on Trading
Although the most successful large enterprises are listed in the Chinese stock exchanges, the 
shares they issue are not all fully tradable. The shares were initially divided into four classes: 
state shares, legal-person shares, individual shares and foreign shares. The shares were also 
divided between A and B shares of which the latter could only be purchased by foreigners 
paying with USD. Later, the right to buy B shares was extended to Chinese citizens but only 
to those holding USD. Of the A shares, the state and legal-person shares came to be known as 
state-owned shares (SOS) which were officially non-tradable. Since the state was a majority 
shareholder in the SOEs, the non-tradable stocks posed certain problems. They undermined 
the value of state-owned assets, property rights of enterprises and the development of a 
secondary stock market (Ma, 2008). In addition to A and B shares, there are also H shares 
which are shares of Chinese SOEs traded in Hong Kong. Foreign institutional investors have 
been able to invest in Chinese A shares, bonds and mutual funds since 2002 but, again, to a 
limited degree (Chow, 2007:249-50). 
3.3.5 Protect the Large and Release the Small
Despite earlier reforms in the 1980s, it was not until the 1990s when real privatization took 
place. In 1995, the state council decided that the state would give up its ownership in small 
and medium-sized enterprises, that is, effectively privatize them while retaining the large 
SOEs. This policy is called Protect the Large, Release the Small (Li, 2001) and it became 
legal in 1997 when the 15th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party granted the local 
governments an official permission to proceed with privatization. and, apart from the largest 
500 or 1000 companies owned by the central government (The Economist, 2011), the 
management of the companies was transferred to municipalities and the local governments 
which received more extensive rights with respect to these companies. The central 
government was no longer responsible for the privatization, restructuring or closing of the 
small – and medium-sized enterprises (Naughton, 2007: 301-302).
3.3.6 Shareholding System Reform and Reduction of Holding of State-Owned Assets
The purpose of the Protect the Large and Release the Small - policy was to eliminate the 
deficits of small and medium-sized SOEs through selling, closing or merging them. This
overall reform regarding the restructuring of SOEs was called Shareholding System Reform 
(SSR) (Ma, 2008). The reform was an attempt to increase the SOE efficiency and profitability 
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(Ma, 2010). Besides SMEs whose shares could not be publicly traded (Chow, 2007:71), the 
reform was also applied as a mainstream reform for larger SOEs in order to turn more of 
them to shareholding companies (Ma, 2008; Chow, 2007:71). SSR entailed a policy of 
reduction of holding of state-owned shares (RHSOS) in the end of the 1990s. Prior to this, 
reduction of state-owned shares had occurred through direct negotiations and the shares had 
been traded over-the-counter at fire-sale prices depreciating their value. To counter this 
process, the government had to make RHSOS an official policy to encourage more 
companies to go public. Reducing the amount of state-owned share became an official policy 
but under the premise that the state retains a controlling interest.
During the next year in 2000, there were over 100 cases of investors buying state-owned 
shares. Despite the initial, positive effect of the SSR on transforming SOEs to publicly traded 
corporations, there were problems with a large number of SOEs listing themselves and 
launching initial public offerings (IPO). A constantly increasing amount of non-tradable 
shares flooded the market and brought the prices down. Because of this, the RHSOS failed at 
first (Ma, 2008).
3.3.7 National Social Security Fund
The RHSOS was revived again in 2001 to finance the newly-established National Social 
Security Fund (NSSF) (Ibid., 2008). There had been a desire to reform the pension system 
which had become a financial burden. To organize and fund the pensions, local governments 
were given more responsibilities of the pensions. However, the transfers of duties to local 
governments led to an encroachment of pension funds and risked their financial stability. To 
prevent local authorities from going bankrupt, the central government decided to create the 
National Social Security Fund. To raise the funds, IPOs and rights issues were made taxable 
through the sale of state-owned shares. As a result, the stock markets reacted aggressively 
and did not calm down until part of the RHSOS was cancelled in the end of 2001. Officially, 
the measures were drawn back because of the concern for social stability. Although the 
number of Chinese investors had been steadily growing, the real reason might have been 
pressure from powerful institutional investors who feared losing the value of their assets 
(Ibid., 2008).
Until now, the state's attempt to reduce its ownership in SOEs and to provide funds for the 
NSSF from sales of state-owned shares had failed as its ownership in SOEs actually grew. In 
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the end, even the NSSF was opposed to the RHSOS because its own shares were decreasing 
in value due to the stock market reactions (Ibid., 2008).
3.3.8 State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
The State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was created 
in 2002 when the unofficial over-the-counter sales and direct negotiations between SOEs and 
private enterprises resumed due to the failure of the RHSOS. Although reduction of state-
owned assets was still on the political agenda, the state required a full price from its shares 
which the markets did not accept. A lesser price was considered by the state council a 
depletion of state assets. The establishment of the SASAC brought the governance of state-
owned assets under one unified body reassembled from different ministries, agencies and 
institutions.  SASAC was thus a compromise between politics and economics, the state’s 
desire to manage and, on the other hand, allow the economy to function freely (Ma, 2008; 
Naughton, 2008).
At first, the SASAC had authority over 196 SOEs which were all sizeable and central to the 
Chinese economy but otherwise rather different by their businesses and industries. These 
include companies from automobile, electricity, chemical, telecom construction, high-tech, 
import-export and research industries. There are no financial companies (Ma, 2008; 
Naughton, 2003). At present, the SASAC exerts control over 117 most central SOEs (The 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council: 
Central SOEs). 
In general, the SASAC’s priority is to defend the value of state-owned shares and sell them at 
the market for reasonable prices (Ma, 2008). The SASAC’s more specific duties include 
regulatory supervision over enterprises, auditing of enterprises, appointments of member of 
board of directors and creation of procedures to appoint managers. The SASAC also approves 
of major decisions affecting the companies such as merger, bankruptcy and issuance of new 
shares and reporting the performance and revenues of companies to appropriate government 
levels. The SAC is not allowed to intervene in the operational autonomy of the enterprises 
nor purse sociopolitical goals (Naughton, 2003: The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council: Policies, Laws and Regulations).
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3.3.9 Share Conversion
To solve the problem of reducing state assets without reducing the value of the assets or 
equity markets, the pilot program known as Equity Division Reform or Share Conversion 
(Ma, 2008) was introduced in 2005. The chosen companies were to start a conversion of non-
tradable shares into tradable ones. The plan had to be accepted by the company's board of 
directors and at least by two-third of the individual shareholders. To make this happen, most 
companies offered bonus shares: every ten tradable shares would receive three bonus shares 
from the state. As the reform proceeded, more and more state institutions came to favor it. In 
less than a year, 70% of the listed companies had completed the conversion or were in the 
process of doing so. The rest were forced to convert their shares or they would be acquired, 
merged or delisted. In 2006, IPOs resumed (Ibid., 2008).
Despite the reform, the state still had power to retain shares. Moreover, no more than 15% of 
the state-owned shares within the first three years of the reform could be sold. The state also 
retained the possibility to acquire more shares. Now it became easier for legal person 
shareholders to cash in the state-owned shares. The share conversion program contributed to 
the speed of the privatization process (Ibid., 2008).
3.3.10 Conclusion
In general, the development of Chinese privatization has proceeded in three steps. The first 
one was the emergence and expansion of SOEs outside the plan in the 1980s. Before this, 
there were no companies operating with a profit motive. Some of these companies were 
known as TVEs and some of them were traditional SOEs producing for both the plan and 
markets. Despite them still being technically state-owned, they were controlled by private 
persons and they were used for profit-making. The process was fostered by managerial 
reforms and creation of monetary incentives and support for the establishment of collective 
firms; policies strengthened by the 12th Central Committee of the CCP. The more traditional, 
industrial SOEs were however strictly state-owned and -controlled but they went through 
significant reforms which subordinated them, although only partly, to the rules of market 
economy. As a result, the operational environment of SOEs changed. Their profitability 
started improving, albeit from a really low starting point and they got a great many 
competitors from the collective and town and village enterprises. Their economic importance 
started declining and they employed fewer and fewer people throughout the 1980s. 
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Privatization, in the real sense of the word and on a larger scale, did not realize until the 
early-mid 1990s. The second significant phenomenon was a successful privatization process 
of SMEs. In this process of Protecting the Large and Releasing the Small, the ownership of 
SMEs was transferred from the central to local governments which on their part allowed 
some of them to become private in order to curb the MBOs and over-the-counter sales at 
local levels leading state assets to be sold at deflated prices.
The third important phase in privatization was the successful completion of the institutional 
framework. The privatization of large, important and well-managed SOEs was started already 
in the early 1990s under the framework of RHSOS. The enterprises were encouraged to list 
themselves in order to gain access to more financial resources. However, this practice 
threatened to bring down their market value and even reverse the economic reforms. The 
RHSOS through SIP went through a couple of failures and did not take place until the state 
could create a concentrated institution for managing state assets which so far had been 
dispersed among various government institutions and levels. The establishment of the market 
institutions, Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges, the SASAC and the share conversion-
program, uniformed and brought the previously unclear ownership rights under a more 
effective control of the state. 
This enabled a more sustainable framework under which partial privatization of large SOEs 
could continue. The reduction of state assets became more stabile and speedier but the state 
still retained a certain amount of shares and the right to purchase more. In addition, the state 
still exercises significant influence over some of its enterprises.
3.4 Overview of Privatization in Japan
In Japan, the state-owned corporations were largely the heritage of the state-military-
industrial complex before the Second World War (Cheung, 2002). After the war, their role in 
the Japanese economy became less significant than in other developed economies partly due 
to the strong American influence (Toyama, 1998). In comparison with other developed 
economies, Japan’s public sector has been rather small producing only 5% of the GDP, 5% of 
the work force and 10% of gross domestic fixed capital formation in the 1970s (Cheung, 
2002; Young, 1987:192; Toyama, 1998). The first privatizations took place after the war. For 
instance, the Tokyo Electric Power Corporation (TEPCO) was incorporated in 1951 after the 
government gave up its monopoly in energy production but a large scale privatization did not 
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take place until the 1980s. The most important public corporations have been in transport, 
utilities and telecommunications (Cheung, 2002).
3.4.1 Japanese Public Sector Enterprises prior to 1984
The core of the public corporation sector was formed by ‘three public corporations and five 
government departments’. The first mentioned included the JTSPC (Japan Tobacco and Salt 
Public Corporation), NTT and Japan National Railways (JNR). They were all established 
through transforming some of the state departments into state corporations: The JTSPC and 
the JNR in 1948 and NTT (previously Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation; 
NNTPC) in 1952 (Toyama, 1998). The government departments were formed by the Post 
Office, Forestry Agency, Printing Bureau, Mint Bureau and Monopoly in Alcohol Bureau 
(Cheung, 2002). In addition to these, there were also three loan and financing corporations 
(Toyama, 1998), 38 departmental business entities and 99 special corporations such as public 
corporations, public foundations, financial corporations and banking institutions operating 
nationally and, finally, some 10,000 municipal companies controlled by various local 
authorities (Cheung, 2002).
Because of the overwhelming significance of NNT, JNR and JTSPC in the Japanese public 
sector, this section focuses, more than on anything else, on their privatization. In spite of the 
small number of Japanese SOEs, the importance of their privatization is not only significant 
in Japan but also internationally. For example, their IPOs are among the most generous in the 
world. According to Thomson Reuters, of the 16 biggest IPOs in the history, four have been 
issued by Japanese companies. NTT Mobile Communications Network Inc., an entity 
separated from NTT, attracted 18 billion USD in 1998 whereas its parent company NTT drew 
13.7 billion USD in 1986. One of the companies formed from JNR, East Japan Railway Co., 
made 9.9 billion USD from its IPO and JT 9.5 billion USD in 1993 (The Wall Street Journal, 
2010).
3.4.2 Structural Problems with Japanese Public Enterprises
According to Cheung (2002), the public corporations had been suffering from low 
profitability and dependency on government subsidies and, since the 1970s, they had become 
a fiscal burden on the government. However, PEs had practices and policies similar to those 
of private companies such as lifetime employment and enterprise unions. The internal 
structure of PEs was not the factor behind their privatization. “Privatization was motivated 
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more by the monopoly and public ownership status of these enterprises, which by the 1980s 
was giving rise to negative impact even on the enterprise management itself.”(Ibid., 2002). 
PEs were subjected to government accounting system which assessed their budgets, profit 
allocation, prices and business composition and which decided on whether PEs were entitled 
to receive loans. In addition, the PEs were obliged to follow the political promises made by 
the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). To make things worse for the PEs, they 
were not allowed to expand or acquire other companies to make up for their losses In short, 
the PEs were between a rock and a hard place; forced to engage in money-losing activities 
and financially constrained by the government regulations while not being able to expand 
(Ibid., 2002). 
The privatization was a product of PEs seeking their way out of the government control and 
government willing to privatize. This process culminated in the 1980s due to the US pressure, 
the international economic trends and the conflicting policies concerning the PEs (Ibid., 
2002). 
3.4.3 Public Corporations Reforms and Privatization
The major reforms to restructure the status of the Japanese SOEs were commenced in the 
1980s. The agency responsible for proposing privatization recommendations, the Provisional 
Commission for Administrative Reform (PCAR), was set up as a vehicle to evaluate the PEs 
and how they could be reformed (Cheung, 2002). In 1982, the commission proposed 
reforming PEs either to joint-stock companies, chartered corporations and fully privatizing 
public and mixed enterprises (Shumpei, 1984:162-163). The core of the public corporation 
sector (NTT, JNR and JTSPC) was decided to be partially privatized in the act of 1984 
(Young 1987:193). 
Subsequently, the privatization of NTT and JM was started in 1985, JRN (renamed JR) in 
1987 and JAL in 1987. So far, the only fully privatized company is Japan Airlines (JAL) 
although it has never been fully owned by the government (Toyama, 1998). JAL became 
private in 1987 when the government sold the 34.5% of the shares it held (Ibid., 1998). In 
2010, the company filed for bankruptcy protection and was subsequently delisted from the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (The Economist, 2011).
In addition to these companies which were all government-controlled companies, four non-
commercial statutory companies, the Japan Highway Public Corporation, the Metropolitan 
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Expressway Public Corporation, the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation and the
Honshu-Shikoku Bridge Authority were privatized in 2005 (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2006:13).
3.4.4 Impediments to Privatization
At first, the government ownership was dispersed at a very slow pace since the government 
was the sole owner. After three public offerings of NTT in the 1980s, the government’s share 
of the total equity was still at 75%. The PCAR recommended both NTT and JT to be 
reorganized as special business entities whose shares, hold by the government, would be 
gradually sold but this has failed to realize. For example, still in 2007, the government still 
owned, as ordered by the law, 33.7% of the total equity of NTT (OECD, 2007: pp. 39-42). In 
the case of JT, the government still owned 50% of the JT shares in 2011 (The Wall Street 
Journal Japan, 2011). Also, the monopolistic production of tobacco has continued (Toyama, 
1998).
According to Toyama (1998), the slow progress of selling the government-owned stocks was 
due to the lack of favorable treatment policies. Unlike in other countries where privatization 
schemes have been popular, there were no discounts, bonuses or other incentives for the 
buyers to acquire stocks nor were the shareholders rewarded in any meaningful way for 
acquiring extra stocks. Also, employee shareholding was not encouraged. 
Furthermore, privatization was also hindered by politics. The close relationship between the 
government and key industries has produced a situation where deregulation or liberalization 
of regulations have been slowed down by vested interests of the politicians, favoring of 
producers rather consumers and private businesses’ dependency on subsidies and 
governmental support (Toyama 1998; 396-397). Privatization and the recommendations of 
the PCAR had been opposed by some member of the Liberal Democratic Party, trade unions 
and the opposition parties. In the end, the privatizations were carried out due to the support 
from the majority of LDP members but not without compromises (Ibid., 1998). 
The only company which was reorganized as recommended by the PCAR, was JR. By 2006, 
three of the six passenger railway companies of the JR Group, JR East, JR Central, JR West, 
have been fully privatized. The rest are not listed and remain fully state-owned (Yanagawa, 
Yoshino, and Harimaya, 2010). Hokkaido, Shikoku and Kyushu Railway companies have 
been corporatized but the government has held all shares without even selling them. The only 
difference between these corporatized entities and government departments is that the 
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formers are governed by commercial, not public law (Toyama, 1998; 396; Yanagawa, 
Yoshino, and Harimaya, 2010).
3.4.5 Postal Privatization
One of the biggest and longest political issues in the 2000s was the Japanese postal 
privatization. Although the plans to privatize the post had been around since the 1980s, the 
project had been continuously postponed and did not become an issue until the policy 
recommendations by the Hashimoto administration and Koizumi administration which 
adopted the project as one of its political priorities (Imai, 2009:140; Porges and Leong, 2006)  
The Koizumi administration began investigating possibilities for privatization. According to 
Porges and Leong (2006), the motivation to privatize the post was to release its huge financial 
assets with total assets reaching 2.07 trillion USD. The post consists of postal, banking and 
insurance services. The assets in the former two sections amount to one quarter of all 
personal financial assets in Japan. Privatization of the post would not only release these assets 
but also increase competition in banking and insurance (Ibid., 2006). 
Privatizing the post was posed challenges because the leaders would have to balance between 
creating a too powerful new post or purposefully weakening the vital infrastructure. In other 
words, the new, private post could not be too big to crowd out all the competition but then 
again they had to be careful not to purposefully create a weak post which would become a 
financial burden to the state (Ibid., 2006)
The initial goal was to divide the post into six entities:
“(1) a privately-owned bank; (2) a privately owned insurance company; (3) a majority-private 
holding company which would wholly own (4) a postal delivery company and (5) a postal 
network company; and (6) an entity to hold pre-privatization bank and insurance assets.” 
(Ibid., 2006:5)  
Due to continuous opposition within the LDP and other parties, the postal privatization 
became so controversial that the Prime Minister Koizumi decided to order a new general 
election in 2005 to weed out the opponents and continue with the privatization plans (Imai, 
2009:142). After the victorious election, the bills were passed to privatize the post. The 
privatization is not immediate but will be gradually carried out by 2017 the entity being split 
into four parts and a holding company. (Washington Post Foreign Service, 2005).
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3.4.6 Conclusion
In order to summarize this section on the privatization of SOEs in Japan, it is important to 
note that the companies in the Japanese public sectors have been few and that their 
significance to the economy has been marginal. Privatization was started as a response to the 
deteriorating performance of the SOEs. Susceptible to political interference but unable to 
expand or innovate, there was political will to change their rigid legal standing more flexible 
and responsive to market signals. This process was influenced by the oil crises, rise of 
neoliberalism, international trends of privatization and deregulation and U.S. pressure.  
Due to the small number of important Japanese SOEs, privatizations have focused on a rather 
small group of companies: NTT, JSTPC, JNR, JAL and Japan Post. Despite this, the 
monetary value of the IPOs launched by the new, separated entities has been significant. New 
IPOs from the dissolved Japan Post are expected to follow their predecessors but, despite the 
final decision to privatize in 2007, the process has suffered from setbacks (Financial Times, 
2009).
Despite normal political opposition and some natural impediments, privatization in Japan has 
proceeded in a rather straightforward manner and the Japanese economy has been able to 
adjust to these changes with only little trouble. From time to time, the privatization plans 
have been encountered with political opposition, of which the most recent incident was the 
halting of privatization of Japan Post. The Koizumi Administration had to order a new 
election in order to secure the privatization. The relative easiness and lack of structural 
problems might be due to the already sophisticated legal and institutional framework of the 
Japanese economy, the small number of the companies privatized their marginal share of the 
labor and effect on the economy. On the other hand, it should be noted that even though the 
privatization has been started, the government still retains significant amounts of their shares.
3.5 Overview of Privatization in South Korea
In comparison with Japan and China, the role of the PEs in Korea has been important but not 
dominant (Chaudburi, 1996:22; Haque, 2000:217). For instance, their share of the GDP and 
total employment has been low (Shirley, 1989). In terms of labor, Korean SOEs have not 
been important and their share of labor has been constantly decreasing since the early 1980s. 
In, 1982, for example, the PEs employed only 1.5% of the workforce and less than 2 per cent 
throughout the decade. In 2007 the number of executive and employees at the public sector 
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had fallen to around 86,000, of which the government plans to cut one-third (Forbes 
International, 2008 9 May S. Korea Moves toward Privatization). They were however used in 
the most important sectors of the economy and they were often used to initiate production in 
industries in which private companies were not able to invest. These included heavy 
industries such as fertilizers, petrochemicals, petroleum and steel and other sectors crucial to 
industrialization. PEs were also used to diversify Korea’s labor intensive products 
(Chaudburi, 1996).
3.5.1 Timeline of Privatization and Reforms in Korea
Privatization of government enterprises has been a long and gradual process starting in the
end of the 1960s and intensifying toward the end of the 1990s and 2000s. The first phase of 
privatization took place between 1968 and 1973. A total of 11 public corporations were 
privatized. These corporations were among the first private companies in Korea after the 
Korean War. The second phase from 1978 to 1983 saw the privatization of seven public 
corporations. The second privatization phase also introduced the 1983 GIE Administration 
Basic Act which restructured the PE governance. The 1987 reform witnessed the 
liberalization of the Korea Stock Exchange and reduction of the government’s ownership in 
two of its largest holdings: KEPCO and POSCO. The fourth phase took place between 1993 
and 1997 when reduction of the government’s ownership in public corporations was 
continued and some of the subsidiaries of public corporations were fully privatized. The fifth 
privatization period from 1998 to 2002 was the most extensive and radical one. Because of
the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), the Korean government was forced to draw up a reform 
plan and had to sell its ownership in 74 corporations in order to improve Korea’s credit 
ranking and to attract foreign investments. Finally, the latest phase of privatization between 
2008 and 2010 has concentrated on privatizing the subsidiaries of the public corporations and 
selling state assets (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010).  
Based on this categorization, I will discuss the phases of privatization but with two 
exceptions. I have combined both the second and the third phase and the fourth and the fifth 
into a longer period due to continuities in privatization policies (Cheung, 2002). Before 
moving on to the actual history of privatization, I will go through the most common public 
enterprise types in Korea. 
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3.5.2 First Privatizations
Until end of the 1970s, the GIEs had been able to take advantage of their near-monopoly 
status and they had been growing 14.5 per cent annually since the inauguration of the Park 
administration (Cheung, 2002, citing Ahn 196:149). Some GIEs had started accumulating 
losses due to exhaustive government regulation, the overall performance staying however still 
profitable (Shirley, 1989; Lim: 30). In spite of the general profitability, the input-output ratio 
of the GIEs was lower than the average ratio (Shirley, 1989).
The first privatization process began in 1968 when the Park government attempting to reduce 
government deficit, sold the companies to the chaebols which were supported by the state in 
the industrialization. The chaebols were also better able to purchase the companies than 
other, private companies (Cheung 2002; Ahn and Kim, 2002; 86-88).
3.5.3 Corporation Reform Period
In the 1980s, there were 90 PEs in Korea. Their total value of the GDP was growing and 
grew to cover 10.4% of the GDP in 1986. Within the sector, the relative value of the GIEs 
and IIEs increased while the size of the GBEs and GEs stayed relatively stable. Their 
previously dominant market position vis-à-vis the private sector had become less competing 
and even supportive to the private sector. In addition, the public sector had become more 
service-oriented (Shirley, 1989).
This period saw the privatization of a few public corporations including Daehan Reinsurance, 
Daehan Oil, Daehan Dredging Corporation, Hanil Bank, Jeil Bank, Seoul Trust Bank and 
Choheung Bank which were sold to the public (Lim). However, even after the privatization, 
the government continued intervening in their business operations (Cheung, 2002; Korea 
Knowledge Sharing Program 2010). Besides these privatizations, important reforms were 
introduced in the public sector. The 1983 GIE management Act increased the autonomy of 
the enterprises, simplified their relationship with the government, shifted the supervision 
from the budget control to that of management supervision of agreed targets and standardized 
their rules and procedures (Shirley 1989; Kim, State-Owned Enterprise Reform and 
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea).
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3.5.4 The 1983 GIE management Act
The reforms included the separation between supervisory and executive boards and removal 
of life-time appointments. The government representation was reduced to just two persons, 
one from the supervisory ministry and one from the Economic Planning Bureau (EPB). 
Managers were given greater autonomy with budgeting, procurement and personnel. The 
right to supervise GIEs was reduced from multiple agencies to one agency. Responsibility for 
auditing and inspections was removed to the Board of Audit. Company appointments have 
been given a priority in manager appointments instead of outside appointments. Rewards 
based on individual performance and lay-offs are used as stick and carrots (Shirley, 1989).
The Management Evaluation Council was created to draw up guidelines for preparing 
management objectives, budget preparation and performance evaluation (Ibid., 1989). One of 
the most important reforms was the creation of the GIE Performance Evaluation System 
whose task was to hold the management accountable for achieving agreed objectives. The 
incentive system and performance indicators were set to monitor and reward managers 
(Shirley, 1989; Kim, State-owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance Reform in
Korea).
The performance of the GIEs has improved since the introduction of the reforms. The 
performance has changed when the GEs have been transformed to GIEs. The net profits of 
the GIEs more than doubled between 1982 and 1986. There however were companies 
registering losses later on (Shirley, 1989; Kim, State-Owned Enterprise Reform and 
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea).
3.5.5 Further Privatizations of the 1980s 
The most important companies subjected to privatization in this period included the Korea 
Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation (KTG), Korea Telecom, The Korea Stock Exchange, 
POSCO and KEPCO (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010; Lessons from privatization: 
labour issues in Developing and Transitional Countries: 31), which were also among the ten
largest SOEs in Korea. 
POSCO and KEPCO were partially privatized through the People’s Share Programme. 
(Cheung, 2002; Van der Hoeven and Sziráczki, 1997). The program was intended to sell 
shares worth of 7.1 billion USD over a period of 1988-92. A part of POSCO, 34.1%, was sold 
to the public in 1988 but the privatization with KEPCO failed due to troubles in the stock 
36
markets. In both cases, employees were also offered shares. KTG was transformed from GEs 
to GIE in 1987 and 49% of its state shares were sold to the public in 1991. In KT, the 
government reduced its holding from 100% to 51% in 1990 (Van der Hoeven and Sziráczki, 
1997: 26, 38). Most shares were sold to individual investors rather than companies (Korea 
Knowledge Sharing Program, 2010). The Korea Stock Exchange had been a GIE since 1984 
but, in 1988, it was transformed into a membership corporation whose shares the government 
sold to the member firms. Despite privatization and transfer of the management to the 
majority shareholders (Cheung, 2002), the stock exchange maintained a close relationship 
with the ministry of strategy and finance (Van der Hoeven and Sziráczki, 1997:42).
3.5.6 The Asian Financial Crisis
Before the AFC hit Korea, Seoul had privatized some PEs including Daehan Tungsten and 
Kookmi Housing Bank and  reduced the holding of state-owned shares in 22 public 
corporations (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program, 2010) and its previously state-owned 
financial institutions (Ha and Lee, 2007).
Initially, the AFC, which broke out in Thailand, was not thought to spread as far as Northeast 
Asia. However, before the 1997 crisis, Korean companies had been suffering from low 
profitability and debt, coupled with weak corporate governance and supervision and 
regulations of the financial sector. Korea also lacked other normal market mechanisms such 
as exiting the markets. Bankruptcies were nonexistent for large corporations and they were 
very bureaucratic procedures. M&As were discouraged and the cross ownership between 
chaebols prevented takeovers. One part of the problem had been the continuous interventions 
by the government to save chaebols. Moreover, the accounting standards, lack of 
transparency and the exaggeration of sales and size did their part in leading to the crisis. 
Especially weak was the performance of the chaebols (Joh, 2004:195-196, 204-207). 
The reforms were started after the crisis. They have concentrated on reforming the 
companies’ capital structure, creating market threats to the companies and improving their 
corporate governance. The IMF and World Bank were heavily involved in pressing through 
the reforms. The government set out to revise accounting standards and corporate statements, 
to eliminate cross-debt-payment guarantee, to improve firms’ capital structure, to place a debt 
limit on 200% debt-equity ratio, to reduce overdiversification, to identify core businesses and 
cooperative relationships with SMEs, to enhance the accountability of management and 
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controlling shareholders, to separate commerce from finance and to discourage circular 
equity investment and intra-group trading (Joh, 2004; Ha and Lee, 2007). 
3.5.7 Post-Crisis Privatization
Although the vulnerability of the Korean economy had originated with the chaebols, the 
SOEs were also subjected to privatization, partially because of the crisis but mainly as a 
follow-up to the earlier 1990s reforms initiated by the Kim Young Sam administration. The 
majority of the reforms caused by the AFC were nevertheless targeted on the chaebols 
(Cheung, 2002; Ha and Lee, 2007). Despite earlier privatization and plans of further 
privatization since the early 1990s, the AFC gave it a new impetus and hastened the process 
(Cheung, 2002). The fears of foreign and, possibly, hostile takeovers (Ha and Lee, 2007) 
changed to the need to attract foreign investments and to reduce government deficits became 
more acute than before (Kim, State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance 
Reform in Korea).
The 1998 phase of privatization was more extensive than the previous ones. 13 GIEs, eleven
GBEs and 75 subsidiaries were inspected and reviewed for the privatization, altogether 99 
government-owned entities. 13 corporations were decided to be only restructured and eleven
to be privatized either immediately or partially. 61 of the subsidiaries were ordered to be 
privatized either immediately or partially. By 2002, all these companies had been privatized 
(Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010; Lim: 40). The privatization of three public 
utilities companies in a phased privatization process was later cancelled as a result of 
opposing act from the subsequent administration (Kim, State-owned Enterprise Reform and 
Corporate Governance Reform in Korea).
The enterprises for sale were open to the public and foreign buyers. Selling to the chaebols 
was intentionally avoided as the state was reluctant to increase their economic power and also 
because the Kim Dae Jung administration was strongly biased against chaebol-led 
development (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program, 2010; Ha and Lee 2007). The Planning 
and Budget Commission (PBC) also sought diffused ownership as it wanted to avoid the 
enterprises from being acquired by too few buyers. (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010 
pp. 21) 
78.3% of the PEs was reduced and 61.8% of the employment (Korea Knowledge Sharing 
Program 2010 pp. 23). In 2002, there were only 13 GIEs left (Lim, Public Enterprise Reform 
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and Privatization in Korea). Moreover, the government received 24 trillion won and ten
billion USD in foreign currency (Ibid. 24) 
3.5.8 The Late 2000s Privatizations
Even after the privatization induced by the AFC the public sector presence continued in the 
Korean economy. In 2008 privatization resumed. The MOSF published a list of 41 
enterprises to be privatized. However, the companies to be privatized were small and fewer 
than expected. The companies included Hynix Semiconductor Incorporation, Daewoo 
Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Corporation and Woori Finance Holdings Corporation 
among others (The Wall Street Journal Asia, Aug, 2008). Of the abovementioned 41 
companies, 27 will be privatized, two abolished and the rest will go through functional 
adjustment9. There were also plans to merge some of the SOEs into a holding company (The
Wall Street Journal, Mar, 2008). 
3.5.9 Conclusion
As in China and Japan, public sector enterprises in Korea have also followed the pattern of 
decreasing importance in their share of the GDP and labor both due to government 
divestments and the private sector growth.   
Privatization in Korea has been gradual and proceeded in periods extending over four 
decades. While the privatizations of the earlier periods were few and modest until the end of 
the 1990s, the overall development of Korean privatization seems to have followed economic 
growth and development (Kim, State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance 
Reform in Korea). 
Apart from structural impetuses of inefficiency and lack of competition for privatization, the 
single most important event affecting the privatization in Korea was the AFC which resulted 
in a series of privatizations of government enterprises. Although the Korean government had 
privatized before, the post-crisis privatization plan was the most extensive one. Also, quick 
privatization and revenue gained from divestment were probably among the reasons why 
Korea was able to recover its economy and return to growth in one year. Another major event 
affecting the privatization was the 1983 GIE Management Act which itself did not directly 
                                                            
9 Functional adjustment is a privatization method first used in 1984 to reconfigure the corporate activities of 
public enterprises competing too closely with the private sector (Cheung, 2002).
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prompt privatization but restructured and streamlined PEs which ended up in making them
more profitable and competitive. Prior to this, government had been divesting its assets.
Finally, People’s Share Programme in the end of the 1980s also facilitated selling 
government divesting. 
4 Dimensions and Methods of Privatization
In this section, privatization experiences and processes will be compared from the viewpoint 
of dimensions and forms of privatizations. First, how privatization has unfolded in East Asia 
will be compared and analyzed using dimensions of privatizations, that is whether countries 
have relied on privatization programs or ad-hoc approaches, whether the privatization has 
been centralized or decentralized by nature and whether privatization has been rapid or 
gradual. Second, the use of privatization methods, which includes SIP, voucher, direct sale 
and privatization from below, will be compared to find out which methods have and have not 
been used. 
4.1 China
4.1.1 Dimensions of Privatization
There have been several programs or campaigns aimed at managing privatization in China. 
One of them was RHSOS, a series of unofficial incidents involving state assets being sold to 
enterprises at very low prices. In 1999, RHSOS was made into an official policy called SSR 
(Shareholding System Reform) which was intended to transform SOEs to shareholding 
companies. The late-1990s mass privatizations were permitted under the official RHSOS but 
the managed privatization of the larger SOEs did not realize until 2003 when the share 
conversion program was adopted in 2005. The roots of these hasty developments were in the 
inadequate reforms made in the 1980s which did not address of the problems of ownership 
and rapidly decreasing state ownership in the 1990s (Ma, 1998; Ma, 2008).
China has applied a dual approach to privatization. In general, the privatization process has 
been largely a local phenomenon (Bowles and Dong, 2002:8). In the mid-1990s, the central 
government gave up its duties regarding the small and medium-sized SOEs and transferred 
their governance and associated tasks to the local governments which were free to merge, 
bankrupt or privatize them (Naughton, 2007:301-302). However, when it comes to the larger 
SOEs, a centralized approach to privatization has been preferred. The SASAC administered 
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by the Chinese state council, now manages some 150 biggest enterprises, down from 196 
enterprises in 2003 (The Economist, 2012; Naughton, 2003). Also, with respect to the 
privatizations the largest SOEs, there are still numerous restrictions regarding their share 
floating and share trading so in this sense, the privatization has not been as complete as in 
some of the smaller companies which have undergone full privatization.
The same division between SMEs and large SOEs is also visible when discussing whether the 
privatization has been rapid or gradual. The mid-1990s saw SMEs being privatized at a very 
rapid pace. In 1994, there were around four thousand private enterprises, in 1997 13 thousand 
and, in 2001, 36 thousand, more than collective enterprises. This development took place 
parallel to the decrease in the number of collectives and the total number of enterprises in 
China (Jefferson, Jian, Yuan and Xinhua, 2003). On the other hand, the overwhelming 
majority of the shares of the 150 largest SOEs are still state-owned so share offerings will 
continue to be part of China’s economic development (The Economist, 2012).
4.1.2 Methods of Privatization
Chinese methods of privatization have included five methods: SIP, direct sales, employee 
shareholding, leasing and privatization from below.
SIPs have been used in the privatization of large SOEs but their use has been restricted with 
various methods. In most countries, public share floats have been the most popular method of 
privatizing SOEs (Jones, Megginson, Nash and Netter, 1999). Until recently, it was not 
possible for SMEs to issue shares publicly (Chow, 2007:71) but, since 2005, in Shenzhen 
stock exchange Chinese SMEs have been able to list themselves on the SME board index 
(Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2012).
The unofficial RHSOS throughout the 1990s was an example of direct sale from the state or a 
local government to investors. These sales were often directly negotiated and led to the sale 
of state assets at very low prices. In addition, the various regulations restricting the sale of 
shares led to the depletion of state-owned assets (Ma, 2008:200). The mid-1990s mass 
privatizations were supported by allowing insider buyouts e.g. managers to buy whole 
enterprises to themselves (MBOs). According to a survey taken by Jie Gan, Yan Guo and 
Chenggang Xu (2010), direct sales have accounted for almost 70% of privatized companies 
between 2000 and 2005 making direct sales the most popular method of privatization. In their 
survey, employee shareholding and leasing covered 10 % and 8% of the privatizations 
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surveyd. The SIPs only accounted for one per cent of privatizations However, Gan, Guo and 
Xu only compared the amount of privatizations. When comparing the market value produced 
by privatization, it becomes more likely that the SIPs have been more dominant and visible in 
this development. For instance, the largest 121 enterprises produced around 80% of the total 
market capitalization of the Chinese stock exchanges (The Economist, 2012).
4.2 Japan
4.2.1 Dimensions of Privatization
In Japan, the 1980s privatization program was initiated by the establishment of a commission 
called the PCAR. The commission’s tasks included suggesting and recommending reforms 
targeted at PEs. The PCAR’s recommendations did not fully realize as only JAL and JNR 
were reorganized as recommended by the commission. Despite privatization in other 
companies, the PCAR’s influence remained miniscule considering that a significant 
proportion of the SOE shares still remain in government ownership. In the case of Japan
Tobacco, the monopoly on the production of tobacco continued (Toyama, 1998). The second 
privatization program was initiated during the Koizumi administration when the plans to 
privatize the Japanese highway corporations and Japan Post were carried out. These plans 
have largely been completed or are in process (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2006: 13; Washington 
Post Foreign Service, 2005).
Based on the OECD criteria which states that privatization is centrally organized when it is 
conducted by ‘(a) a unit within a financial ministry or a central agency of the government; (b) 
a dedicated privatisation body; (c) a holding company of the government’(OECD 2003, 
pp.13), Japanese privatization has been centralized to a high degree. The Ministry of Finance 
carries out the process of selling government-owned assets. The three core PEs (JNR, NTT 
and JT) were, prior to their corporatization, government departments managed and 
administered by their corresponding ministries. For example, NTT and Japan Post together 
formed the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications which was a part of a larger entity, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. JNR, on the other hand, was under the 
authority of the Ministry of Transportation (Nakamura, 1996). JAL, prior to the complete 
privatization of the company in 1987, was a public-private company of which the government 
owned 50% stake. JAL was under the authority of the Ministry of Transport (Time, 2009).
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Japanese privatization has been gradual both regarding the totality of the state assets and 
individual companies. For example, the IPOs of both NTT and JR East comprised only 1.5% 
of their total assets (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1996:7). Only two companies, TEPCO and 
JAL, have been fully privatized. Despite continuous divestments of government assets, the 
Japanese government still owns significant amounts of public enterprise shares.
4.2.2 Methods of Privatization
Apart from SIP, Japan has not used direct sales of the government assets nor has there been 
voucher privatization. Management buyouts have also been used (OECD, 2007). All the 
companies in Japan have been privatized through public share issuances which probably 
reflect developed stock markets and the large size of privatized companies. However, it is a 
rather difficult task to determine whether SIP or management buyouts have been used since 
these are not exclusive in Japan unlike in China where restrictions on share trading exist. 
Employee shareholding has not been encouraged in Japan (Toyama, 1998).
4.3 Korea
4.3.1 Dimensions of Privatization
Several privatization and reform programs have been used in Korea. The privatization 
programs have taken place in 1968, 1978, 1993, and 2008 (Kim and Kim, 2001; Korea 
Knowledge Sharing Program, 2010). These programs tend to have formed in the presidential 
administrations. With the most important reforms driving the process forward were GIE 
Management Act in 1983, the Corporate Governance Reforms in 1998 (Lim, 2002) 
established to reform the public sector. The responsibility for privatization has usually 
belonged to the line ministries. One less important program was the People’s Share 
Programme which was intended to be used in the privatization of POSCO and KEPCO.
Like in Japan, privatization has largely been centralized in Korea where the Privatization 
Steering Committee is in charge of the overall process and delegates the task of devising 
industry specific plans to the corresponding line ministries (Asia Development Bank, 2001). 
However, it could be said that since 1984 privatization had been decentralized. Before 1984, 
the authority over the PEs was overseen by corresponding ministries. These tasks were 
transformed in the Basic Law on the Management of Government Investment Corporations to 
the Auditing Board (Cheung, 2002).
43
Korean privatization has been very gradual and has proceeded in four, continuous cycles. The 
first cycle took place between 1968 and 1973. The second phase in the Korean privatization 
extended from 1978 to 1988. Privatization resumed in 1993 and was boosted by the AFC and 
subsequent demands from the IMF in 1998. This period lasted until 2002. The last cycle was 
initiated in 2008 and continued till 2010 (Kim and Kim, 2001: Korea Knowledge Sharing 
Program, 2010). 
4.3.2 Methods of Privatization
In terms of privatization methods, Korea has used SIPs, direct sales, employee shareholding 
and management buy-outs (Haque, 2000). Direct sales were the dominant privatization 
method in the earlier privatization phases when the companies were sold to the chaebols 
which often were the only potential buyers. Another reasons why privatized companies were 
sold to the chaebols was the chaebols’ role in the industrialization plans (Ahn and Kim, 2002; 
86-88). This relationship between the state and chaebols was so extensive that some authors 
question the private status of the chaebols (Lim, 2002:15) In the 1980s, selling state assets to 
chaebols has been tried to avoid due to growing fears of increasing Chaebols’ economic 
power. In the 1990s, the government even imposed a 7% limit on how many shares chaebols
are allowed to acquire (Lim, Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Korea: Lessons 
for Developing Countries: 2).
During this time, Employee shareholding was promoted in the People’s Share Programme
which was targeted at privatizing six enterprises including POSCO, KEPCO and KTG. 
Around 20% of the shares were reserved for the employees (Van der Hoeven and Sziráczki,
1997:38). MBOs were also supported during this time and their use has been increasing since 
the early 2000s (OECD, 2007). 
SIPs have been a popular method of privatizing and their use is likely to become more 
popular due to the development of capital markets. Successful examples of SIPs include the 
share floating of POSCO which produced an exceptionally large IPO of 3.4 billion USD 
in1988 (Megginson and Netter, 1997).
4.4 Conclusion
The following tables summarize the comparison of the dimensions and the use of methods of 
privatization in East Asia. 
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Program Ad hoc Centralized Decentralized Rapid Gradual
China x x x x x
Japan x x x
Korea x x x x
Table 1. Dimensions of Privatization. 
The use of ad hoc-privatization has been non-existent. Although the programs have not been 
designated as such it is clear that there were no single privatizations. All privatizations have 
occurred as a result of political planning and in tandem with other privatizations. 
The degree of centralization and decentralization in privatization has strongly varied between 
the countries. In China, the privatization of the large SOEs has been centrally managed since 
2005 but the privatization of many SMEs has been decentralized. In Japan, the privatization 
has been largely centralized due to the large size of the companies. Likewise, the Korean 
privatization has been centralized as it has been directed by the central government. 
No country has taken a rapid approach similar to the early 1990s Russia practically privatized 
all state assets overnight. Some smaller and medium-sized companies have been fully 
privatized very rapidly, especially in China. Also, the post-AFC privatization was carried out 
in a rapid pace, although not all companies chosen for privatization were fully privatized. In 
general, the pace of privatization in East Asia has been gradual.  
SIP Direct Sale Leasing Privatization 
from below
China x x x x
Japan x
Korea x x
Table 2. Methods of Privatization. 
With regard to the use of methods, a variety of privatization forms has been used. China and 
Korea have used more diverse methods of privatization than Japan which has solely relied on 
the use of SIP. On the other hand, China was the only country to have privatized from below. 
Although it did not produce private companies in the purest sense of the word, it did manage 
to lift the major restrictions on entering the market (Naughton, 1994). However, Japan and 
Korea had had lower barriers to market entry than China. In China, the use of direct sales has 
been more popular than SIP, although in value production SIPs have been the most used
method of privatization. China was also the only country to have used the method of leasing 
in privatization. In Korea, direct sales were used mainly in the first round of privatization but 
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since then their use has become much less used. Later on, the methods have become more 
diverse including SIPs. Similar to China and Japan, SIPs have produced the most value.
5 Factors behind Privatization in East Asia
5.1 Economic Development
In this subsection, economic development is primarily understood as economic growth, in 
other words, the growth of the GDP per capita10. Although GDP growth does not fully cover 
all the nuances of economic development, it is nonetheless an easy and simple tool for a 
meaningful comparison. 
Comparing the GDP rates per capita with the timing of the first privatization in each country, 
it becomes clear that the first privatizations have all occurred at only a slightly different level 
of GDP in each country. For example, the mid-1990s GDP per capita in China was around 
2,521 USD whereas the Korean GDP per capita in 1968 stood at 1768 USD11.
With the exception of TEPCO, which was privatized in 1951 (TEPCO Corporate History), 
Japan started privatizing relatively late. There are good reasons to exclude TEPCO from this 
analysis. The privatization of TEPCO is easily seen as an exception to the timing of other 
privatizations so it could be speculated that its privatization was a political solution to a 
certain problem which pushes the case outside the privatization discourse of the 1980s. 
Although the Japanese economy had largely been privately led, the GDP had risen to 21 588 
USD per capita by 1986. If the case of TEPCO is included, Japan can be said to have started 
privatizing already at a level of 1873 USD per capita12. Including TEPCO to the comparison, 
all the countries have started privatizing at only slightly different levels of GDP; China at 
2521, Korea at 1768 and Japan at 1873 USD. However, after the privatization of TEPCO, 
there was no significant privatization until the 1980s when the Japanese GDP per capita was 
at the level of a developed country.
                                                            
10 The figures are adjusted in purchase power parity. 
11 Gapminder: GDP/Capita US$, Inflation Adjusted. China, Japan and South Korea selected 
http://www.gapminder.org Accessed on Jan 20th, 2012.
12GDP per Capita in 1950. http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_per_cap_in_195-economy-gdp-per-
capita-1950 Accessed on Jan 20th, 2011.
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The 1980s privatization originated within the international economy itself, not individually in 
each country. This is why privatization, albeit differently and to a different degree, has 
occurred across economies of different stages of development. In short, the current 
privatization trend is not related to any level of economic development.
5.2 Business Cycles and Timing of Privatizations
Business cycles denote the changing cycles of expansions and contractions in economic 
activity (Investopedia: Business Cycle). According to Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004), the 
incidents of privatization increase during times of booming business. This happens due to 
increasing market prices which makes it attractive for the government to divest its assets. If 
privatization is timed accurately, the proceeds from divestments can be considerable for the 
state. On the opposite, if the timing of privatization fails and the company is sold at the 
market at a wrong time, divestments can turn out be substantially less than expected (Brada 
and Ma, 2007).   
Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact moment of privatization, whether it is the 
privatization decisions or moments of divestments which matter, I think it is however 
possible to approximate the start of a growth cycle and privatization period to see if they 
correlate. In addition, the nature of the first privatizations has been very different in each 
country. The Chinese had started partial but very limited privatization in the early 1990s and 
the mass privatizations of the mid-1990s were only local in nature. When the Korean state 
started privatizing in 1968, the assets were mainly sold to the chaebols in an attempt to 
strengthen their role in industrialization. In Japan, the first real privatizations were massive in 
size and, thus, internationally significant. 
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Figure 1. Vertical line: Change in Percentage Horizontal line: Year. East Asia Economic Growth 1980-2008. 
Source: World Bank Data: Annual Percentage GDP Growth. Compiled by the Author. 
5.2.1 Nippon Telecom and Japan Tobacco
In Japan, share floats of NTT and JT failed to produce the expected value. NTT launched its 
IPO in 1986 after two years of medium economic growth, 3.1 and 5% respectively. The years 
after NTT’s share offering started showing signs of weakening economic growth pressing 
down the price of NTT stocks. Also, the 1987 stock market crash also affected the prices. 
This slowed down the process of privatization. The same development applies to JT which 
launched its IPO in 1994 but was not able to excite the investors (Dewenter and Malatesta, 
1996:7). 
5.2.2 Japan Railways
JR East launched its IPO in 1993 and the last remaining government-owned shares are sold in 
2002 (East Japan Railways Company: Key Dates). The company’s IPO was launched during 
a period of low growth. The previous year’s growth rate had been 0.8% and in 1993 it was 
0.17%. Japan Central Railway Company was listed in 1997 after 2.6% growth in 1996. West 
Japan railway listed in 1996 when the previous year’s growth had been 1.8% (West Japan 
Railway Company: History). Despite launching the shares in a period of low growth, the 
stock prices of JR East have done relatively well to the extent that during the IPO, the 
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demand for JT’s shares was pushing down the prices of all other stocks (Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 1996:7). 
5.2.3 POSCO
POSCO was the first Korean company listed through the People’s Share program in 1988 and 
after 1997 the decisions to fully privatize the company were made. These decisions were 
implemented in 2000. The first privatization followed strong economic growth of 10.6% and 
11.1% in 1986 and 1987. The final shares were sold in an economic upswing following a 
9.4% growth in 1999 and 8.4% in 2000 (POSCO: History of POSCO). 
5.2.4 KEPCO
A year after POSCO, KEPCO, the biggest PE in Korea, went public in 1989 after strong 
growth of 10.6% in 1988 and 11.15% in 1987. After the 1997 crisis, the government’s 
ownership of the company was reduced from 69.6% in 1997 to 52.2% in 2000 (Nam, 2004: 
Table 4.2). Since 2006, the government’s ownership of the company has been maintained at 
around 21% (KEPCO, Shareholder Structure)  
5.2.5 KT&G
KT&G was privatized in 1999 as a part of the government’s privatization scheme caused by 
the AFC. The last remaining government shares of Korea Tobacco were sold in 2002 after the 
economy had recovered (Highbeam Business, 2004). However, the high initial prices of the 
IPO almost halved by 2002 (Reuters Finance, KT&G Corp) 
Privatization in Korea has followed strong economic growth. In terms of timing, the 
privatizations has been successful. However, the external shock of the AFC and policy 
pressures from the IMF made the Korean government to engage in a large privatization 
scheme. Despite the severe economic downturn, the Korean economy was already growing 
probably both due to the mass privatization of many of its PEs. However, for privatization 
this was a virtuous cycle of soaring stock prices making privatization a less comfortable 
option. This development also raises the question to what extent privatization induces 
economic growth. 
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5.2.6 Timing of Chinese Privatizations    
The Chinese share offerings are more difficult to judge on the basis of privatization timing 
due to continuous high growth throughout the previous decades. However, the constantly 
increasing number of companies listing themselves could be a sign of appreciating assets. But 
at the same time, it can be interpreted as a removal of restrictions towards listing and public 
share offerings as well as an attempt of the government to increase the listings and market 
capitalization of its stock exchanges. For example, in the 2000s the growth was accelerating 
each year until 2008. However, this period of time has also produced the bulk of the 
privatization proceeds in China; 170.7 billion USD. In comparison, the 1990s produced a 
mere 20.6 billion USD. Toward the end of the 1990s, the economic growth in China was 
decelerating until 1998 after which it began rising again (World Bank. Privatization Data 
1988-1999 and 2000-2008). This development is more likely due to the successful lift of bans 
and introduction of share conversion than just expanding economy. 
5.2.7 Conclusion
Timing privatization accurately is as easy as predicting future economic growth. There are 
clear differences to the timing of listing. Thus, it is no wonder that there were clear 
differences to the timing of privatization. Also even though the timing might be accurate, 
nothing can guarantee a favorable outcome for the stock prices. In Japan, privatizations of 
NTT and JT were less successful than the share offering of JR East despite the fact that JR 
East went public during low economic growth. In Korea, the first privatizations of KEPCO, 
POSCO and KT&G were implemented after economically favorable years. The later 
privatizations also took place during good years but were caused by a severe fall in the 
Korean economy. 
So, are there more privatizations during high growth years? Based on this unstatistical 
analysis, one could say that the governments tend to intentionally avoid share offerings 
during the bad years but might be compelled to do so like Korea was in 1997. Also, timing 
privatization in a high growth period is desirable but, due to unknown variables, it might also 
be unattainable.
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5.3 Government Debt
The assumption is that the growing amount of national debt puts pressures on the government 
to privatize. For example, Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2001) link the late 2000s 
privatization in Korea to the rapid increase of the Korean national debt induced by the AFC 
in 1997. Looking at the general accumulation of government debt in China, Japan and South 
Korea seem to verify their proposition on a grand scale.
The levels of debt in East Asia have all accumulated at a very different rate. First of all, the 
level of the Japanese debt is overwhelming whereas the corresponding figure for Korea is low 
among developed economies. The Chinese debt is relatively small but during the last 25 years 
it has increased ten-fold. Apart from these differences, the overall trend in the level of 
national debts in East Asia during the last 30 years is increasing, although in the case of 
Korea this development is less unambiguous. The Korean national debt continued decreasing 
until 1996 when the debt-to-GDP ratio was eight per cent. Since then, the trend has been that 
of increasing debt. The equivalent ratio for Japan went through a period of decreasing debt 
between 1987 and 1991. Since then, the ratio has been on the increase every year since 1981 
with the exception of the year 2006. The development of the Chinese government debt has 
been less even. Throughout the 1990s and late 2000s the debt levels have been turbulent but 
rising (Figure 2.). 
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Figure 2. Vertical Line: Percentage of Debt to GDP. Horizontal  Line: Year. Central Government Debt to GDP 
in East Asia. Source: Index Mundi; China Public Debt: OECD Statistics: Central Government Debt. Compiled 
by the Author.
In fact, the debt levels have risen in all three countries between 1996 and 2000, a period 
which appears to be a certain kind of a vantage point. The Chinese and Korean government 
debt more than doubled whereas the Japanese government debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 
68.9% to 106.1%. The growing national debt in Japan since 1992 however was a long-term 
product of the burst of the Japanese bubble which was further contributed by the 1997 crisis.
5.3.1 China
In China, the growth of debt caused by the AFC took place at two levels: the central and local 
government level. Between 1997 and 1998, the Chinese local government debt grew 48.2% 
(Institute for New Economic Thinking, 2011). At the same time, the central government had 
to protect the banks which had financed the SOEs. To finance this, some of the SOEs had to 
be privatized (World Socialist Web Site, 2011). The campaign of Protect the Large, Release 
the Small was officially started in 1997 when the ownership rights of many state-owned 
SMEs were transferred to the local government. While the transfer of ownership rights may 
have saved the central government from excessive debts, it has put the local government’s 
budgets on strain. To conclude, the early Chinese privatization was connected to the rise of 
both central and local government debt caused by the AFC. Since then, the level of debt had 
continued rising in spite of privatization. However, the level of debt has not decreased but 
instead kept on increasing. Between 2008 and 2009, the local government debt growth 
amounted to 61.9% (Institute for New Economic Thinking, 2011). The reduction of debt 
between 2004 and 2006 is likely due to the successful program of share conversion which 
enabled the listing of large SOEs producing proceedings for the government.  
5.3.2 Japan
In Japan, debt reduction has been one of the goals associated with the privatization plans. For 
example, in the late 1980s after the IPOs of NTT and when the highway toll network was 
privatized in 2005, the national debt was reduced (Laurino and Grimaldi, 2010). Prior to 
privatization, the levels of debt have been on the increase and after the privatization of the 
four highway corporations and NTT, the level of debt has also decreased. However, the IPOs 
of JR in 1993 and JT in 1994 did not have the same effect on the debt levels, even though the 
privatization of JR was considered a success (See Figure 2.).
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5.3.3 Korea
In Korea, the debt level significantly decreased from the mid-1980s until 1997 probably due 
to the the adoption of the 1983 GIE Management Act which itself was affected by the
previous rising levels of debt. The subsequent privatizations of the late 1980s and early 1990s
were also among the factors affecting the reduction of government debt. The effects of the 
AFC and subsequent increased in debt on the privatization were positive (Bortolotti, Fantini 
and Siniscalco, 2001) but the post-crisis privatizations have not pushed the debt levels down. 
However, the drastic measures taken to counter the crisis were able to revive the economic 
growth. 
5.3.4 Conclusion
During the past 30 years, all three countries have increased their loan taking and the 
accumulating debt has had an effect on privatization of state-owned assets. Both in Japan and 
Korea, the rising levels of debt in the early 1980s were encountered with corporate reforms 
and privatizations. As a result, the growth of debt was tamed and both Japan and Korea went 
through a period of decreasing government debt. In the early 1990s, the Japanese government 
debt started growing again and the government resorted to further privatizations which 
however did not reduce the national debt further. The Korean and Chinese national debt 
began rising as a result of the AFC. In China, the privatization occurred due to the transfer of 
ownership rights from the central to the local government and bailing out of the state-owned 
banks by the central government. In Korea, the harsh privatization program was set up mainly 
to gain revenue for the state and restore the faith of international organizations and investors. 
Because of the crisis, the government debt in Japan increased as well. However, despite the 
privatization measures, the government debt in China, Japan and Korea continued rising. In 
China, the debt was temporarily reduced in 2004 and 2005 probably due to the share 
conversion program. In Japan, the liabilities were also temporarily reduced in 2005 with the 
revenues gained from the privatization of the highway corporations. The late 2000s financial 
crisis increased the national debts drastically which gives a reason to expect further 
privatizations. 
5.4 Fiscal Impetuses for Privatization
There are both compelling factors and desirable goals which affect the decisions and actual 
acts of privatization. More often than not, these factors overlap and are interchangeable. For 
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instance, governments owning unprofitable SOEs are likely to proceed with privatization to 
both gain revenue and reduce their liabilities. There are also external and structural reasons 
like foreign pressure, level of economic development and national debt affecting privatization 
which is not always based on economic considerations either. 
In general, following factors are acknowledged as important factors and goals influencing 
privatization in the literature: government deficits, soft budget constraints, debt, capital 
market conditions, concerns for efficiency, introduction of more competition and lessening of 
political interference (Mizutani and Uranishi 2010; Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2001).
After looking at the general reasons behind privatization in East Asia, impetuses for 
privatization are then viewed and analyzed against the structural background of economic 
development, business cycles, debt and external influences.
5.4.1 China
The privatization pattern of small and medium-sized enterprises followed hardening budget 
constraints (e.g. companies have to take control of their own finances instead of a bank) (Guo 
and Yao, 2005). In the mid-late 1990s, the Chinese government sought to reduce the number 
of SOEs by transferring all but the most important companies to the responsibility of local 
governments. But at the same time, many banks were constrained in their lending to SOEs 
and their liquidity regulations which led the local governments to privatize, bankrupt or 
merge many of their newly acquired SOEs if they were not able to persuade the banks to 
continue on lending (Yusuf, Nabeshima and Perkins, 2005; Guo and Yao, 2005: Brandt, Li, 
and Roberts, 2001).
In the case of the most important larger SOEs capable of listing in the stock exchanges, share 
offerings were meant to diversify the sources of their funding in order to alleviate the 
domestic banks which had a huge number of non-performing loans. (Yusuf, Nabeshima and 
Perkins, 2005). One of the key problems with the Chinese SOEs had been debt and it has also 
been one of the central reasons leading to the late-1990s reforms. After the first economic 
experiments, SOEs started piling debt assisted by the state-owned banks. In 15 years from 
1980 to 1994, the SOEs increased their debts from 18.7 to 79% in relation to their assets. 
Without financial scrutiny, the amount of non-performing loans had reached around 50% of 
all bank assets (Sun, Tong and Tong, 2002:12). However, according to a study conducted by 
Kai Guo and Yang Yao (2005), high levels of debt have been one of the factors preventing 
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privatization: investors and buyers are not interested in highly indebted companies operating 
at marginal profits. 
5.4.2 Japan
At the time of privatization, Japan was already a developed economy with world-class 
enterprises. According to Mizutani and Uranishi, the public corporations in a mature 
economy operating in commercialized industries controlled by few regulators and receiving 
only few subsidies are more likely to be privatized. (Mizutani and Uranishi 2008:534). 
The reforms can also be seen in a more general context; the end of strong growth and 
subsequent, diminishing tax revenues and increased governmental spending put pressure on 
fiscal restructuring of the government activities. (Shumpei 1984:146). 
According to Cheng (2002), the public corporations had been suffering from low profitability 
and dependency on government subsidies and, since the 1970s, they had become a fiscal 
burden on the government. However, PEs had practices and policies similar to those of 
private companies such as lifetime employment and enterprise unions. The internal structure 
of PEs was not the factor behind their privatization.
“Privatization was motivated more by the monopoly and public ownership status of these 
enterprises, which by the 1980s was giving rise to negative impact even on the enterprise 
management itself.”
(Cheung, 2002) 
PEs were subjected to government accounting system which assessed their budgets, profit 
allocation, prices and business composition and which decided on whether public enterprises 
were entitled to receive loans. In addition, the PEs were obliged to follow the political 
promises made by the ruling party, the LDP. To make things worse for the PEs, they were not 
allowed to expand or acquire other companies to make up for their losses In short, the PEs 
were between a rock and a hard place; forced to engage in money-losing activities and 
financially constrained by the government regulations while not being able to expand. (Ibid.,
2002) 
The privatization was thus a product of PEs’ low profitability and business inflexibility
seeking their way out of the government control and government willing to privatize. This 
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process culminated in the 1980s due to the US pressure, the international economic trends 
and the conflicting policies concerning the PEs (Ibid., 2002).
5.4.3 Korea
In Korea, the reasons behind privatization have been diverse. The more structural factors 
were the economic growth and maturation of the Korean economy and consequent 
liberalization and internalization of the 1980s. At the time, PEs were heavily influenced and
dependent on the government policies but these impediments to the growth did not form a 
major reason to privatization until the late 1990s when the state finances became very 
restrained due to the AFC. The rationale for privatizations prior to 1997 changed from 
supporting market economy, financial markets and employee shareholding to gaining extra 
revenue for the state but they had all been moderate in comparison to the magnitude of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s privatizations (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program, 2010:20-21).  
The privatization of KT in 2002 reflects the multitude of factors influencing privatization in 
Korea. In addition to the concerns for efficiency and development of telecommunications 
sector and raising revenue for the government, privatization was also pushed by foreign and 
domestic interests namely U.S. and chaebols (Kim, 2009:117). Also, in terms of motives for 
privatization, Korea has probably been most influenced by foreign pressures to privatize in 
East Asia (See External Influences). Thus, before the crisis, there were problems with the PEs 
(dependency, lack of financial and business freedom and inefficiency) but there had been no 
sudden surge to privatize them before the crisis. The impetus being an external shock, the 
government finances were suddenly restrained and, in order to receive financial help and 
immediate funding, mass privatization of state assets was one of the key solutions to alleviate 
the situation. To conclude, government budget constraints presented the overarching reason 
to privatize. Korea has also intentionally avoided politicization of company management and 
the conglomerates from growing too strong. For example, POSCO was not privatized on the 
ground of inefficiency but to prevent the corporation from engaging with politics (Lim, 
Public Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Korea: Lessons for Developing Countries;
Kim: State-Owned Enterprise Reform and Corporate Governance in Korea).
5.4.4 Conclusion
When comparing the impetuses for privatization, it is clear that the fiscal distress has been 
among the key factors behind privatization. However, the strain on public finances 
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manifested itself very differently in China, Japan and Korea. In China, the fiscal constraints 
had to do with the banks which had been lending cheap credit to the SOEs to the extent that 
the outstanding debt threatened the stability of the banks. The budgets of many SOEs were 
hardened by limiting the banks’ right to lend money. Related to this issue, there was also an 
objective to make SOEs more efficient and, thus, less dependent on the government and bank 
funding. In Japan, the situation for many SOEs prior to the privatization was a deadlock. On 
one hand, they were subjected to rigid regulations governing their production, expansion and 
monopoly status to guarantee government revenue. Furthermore, they were also used for 
purely political purposes. On the other hand, the role of SOEs as revenue had started 
declining due to their growing fiscal dependency on the government caused by their protected
statuses. In short, the revenue gained from SOEs was decreasing in relation to their costs. 
This happened in tandem with the companies themselves unable to turn their losses into 
profits without a change in the legislation governing their market status.
5.5 External Influences
External influences on privatization can be divided into U.S economic pressure and 
associated policies and external shocks like the AFC. Furthermore, these factors played their 
part in shaping privatization policies mainly in Japan and Korea but also to some extent in 
China. It is worth mentioning that external influences in general tend to play a less significant 
role in determining privatization policies than, for example, financial constraints. 
5.5.1 China, Japan and the Asian Financial Crisis
Although the Chinese economy did not collapse in the AFC due to its lesser penetration in the 
world economy and protected financial system, the AFC did undoubtedly affect the process 
of privatization in China. The weaknesses of the SOEs were publicly acknowledged in the 
15th Party Congress in 1997 and many of them were ordered to bankruptcies, mergers and 
privatizations (Sharma, 2002). While this is clear, it is less obvious to what extent the 
individual Chinese leaders have been influenced by neoliberal economic policies of 
deregulation and privatization, and how these ideological factors have played out in the 
Chinese privatization. 
The effect of the crisis on Japan stayed minimal when compared to other countries. Although 
the crisis set in motion three bankruptcies and contracted outward investments, Japan 
remained relatively unharmed in comparison to China and South Korea. Japan was not 
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among the victims of the AFC despite its heavy involvement in investing in Southeast Asian 
nations. 
5.5.2 Korea and the Asian Financial Crisis
In the Korean case, the external factors influencing privatization are easy to identify. By 
1997, Korea had become more open to investments and crediting. Due to the liberalization of 
the financial system and access to foreign credit, the badly indebted companies became more 
vulnerable to external shock and financial speculators. As a result, Korea was badly hit by the 
AFC in 1997. In fact, although the crisis was not the sole reason for privatization which had 
been going on for decades, the AFC made the process more imperative than before and 
hastened the process (Cheung, 2002). The subsequent privatization plan was more extensive 
than the earlier privatizations. Although the main victims of the crisis were the Korean 
chaebols and despite the relatively good performance of the Korean PEs, the depleting tax 
revenues made the government to privatize altogether 61 PEs affecting 78.3% of the 
enterprises and 61.8% of the employment (Korea Knowledge Sharing Program 2010). In 
addition to the diminishing tax base in influencing the privatization, The IMF and World 
Bank were also involved in pressing through the reforms. Although the proposed reforms 
included more than just privatization, e.g. elimination of cross-debt-payment guarantees, 
reduction of overdiversification, increase of regulations and accountability, privatization was 
seen by the Korean leaders as means to show their commitment to the reforms in order to 
receive loans (Ha and Lee, 2007; Joh, 2004; Kim and Kim, 2001; Letter of Intent of the 
Government of Korea, IMF, 1998).
5.5.3 U.S. Influence
In terms of privatization, Japan and Korea have been substantially more influenced by foreign 
factors than China. First of all, the general composition of private and public sector of the 
Japanese GDP, since the war, tilted toward the private companies. According to Toyama 
(1998), Japan’s small PE sector is due to the strong American influence and, unlike other 
developed economies, Japan did not engage in massive nationalization of its strategic 
industries. Secondly, privatizations of single SOEs has from time to time been under the US 
influence.  
According to Marianna Strzyzewska-Kaminska (1993:363), in the case of the privatization of 
NTT "..the concept of deregulation and privatization has been an American export to 
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Japan;” The US, as a first mover in privatization of telecommunications, was pushing other 
countries to privatize. In the case of NTT, U.S. pressured Japan to privatize the 
telecommunications industry to increase the presence of American companies in the Japanese 
service sector to relieve its trade deficits with Japan which was a major telecommunications 
exporter At the time, the sector was regulated and protected from international competition, 
and to relieve its trade deficits with Japan which was a major telecommunications exporter. 
For similar reasons of market expansion and trade imbalance, the US government pressured 
Korea to proceed on the privatization of its telecommunications (Jin, 2006). In the 1990s, 
there were similar disputes concerning a Japanese insurance provider, Kampo, an SOE, and 
other insurance providers competing unfairly with private companies with American 
companies. Japan has responded that these discrepancies will be taken care by the postal
privatization (Cooper, 2011)
5.5.4 Conclusion
To sum up, in comparison, China has been relative untouched but not unaffected by external 
influences in relation to privatization. The AFC influenced China's privatization but in Korea, 
the crisis made the government to privatize. In addition, China has not been directly 
influenced by the US in relation to privatization. In Korea, it was the combination of the AFC 
and subsequent, conditional help from the IMF what sped up the privatization process. 
Another but less significant external factor influencing privatization in Korea was the entry to 
the WTO. In terms of external factors influencing privatization, Japan was the least affected 
by the AFC. If the crisis had any effect on the decisions to privatize, for instance the IPO of 
NTT Mobile Communications Network in 1998, the causal relationship is less 
straightforward than in Korea. In the 1980s, Japan’s economy was undoubtedly more 
international than that of Korea’s or China’s and thus more susceptible to the politics, trends 
and pressures of the global economics. In addition, unbalanced trade relations made Japan 
more exposed to criticism from both international trade interests and US pressure. 
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6 Outcomes of Privatization
6.1 Proceeds from Privatization
6.1.1 China
Between 1992 and 1999, the Chinese government raised 20.6 billion USD through 
privatization. From 2000 to 2008, Chinese privatization projects produced 170.7 billion USD. 
By 2008, altogether 327 companies have been share issue privatized generating 191.3 billion 
USD for the Chinese government (World Bank. Privatization Data 1988-1999 and 2000-
2008). These figures only address the SIP of larger SOEs excluding the smaller firms directly 
sold to their managers or employees (Direct sale privatization). 
6.1.2 Japan
In case of Japan, different proceedings from privatization have apparently been calculated 
using different variables and historical data by different authors. Due to varying figures on 
the total value of Japanese privatization, I cannot give an exact figure but I have to make do 
with estimates. According to Friedrich Schneider, Japanese privatizations have generated 146 
billion USD in revenue for the state in the time period between 1961 and 2000 (Schneider, 
2003. Table 2.) Very different figures are given by Bernardo Bortolotti, Marcella Fantini and 
Domenico Siniscalco (2003) who have calculated the privatization proceedings between 1977 
and 1999 to amount to 189.4 billion USD. The gap between these calculations amounts to 
43.4 billion USD. Even if direct privatizations were integrated, which were non-existent in 
Japan before the 2000s (Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco, 2003. See PO/Deals ratio) the 
aggregate value of privatizations would only amount to 183.6 billion (OECD, 2002. Table 1). 
Between 2000 and 2007, Japanese privatization amounted to 33.2 billion USD (OECD, 2009. 
Table 1). Taken together, divestment of state assets has yielded 179.2 13, 216.8 or 222.6 
billion USD in a 45 years’ time, from 1961 to 2007.  
                                                            
13 My own calculation based on the figures given in OECD, 2009 Table 1., Bortolotti, Fantini and Domenico, 
2003. Table 2., Schneider, 2003. Table 2. and OECD, 2002. Table 1.  
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6.1.3 Korea
The exact value of total proceeds gained from privatization in Korea is also difficult to 
establish due to the lack of reliable data collected on privatization and lack of historical data 
regarding the earlier privatizations prior to the 1980s. The data presented below rests on the 
privatization transactions carried out in the mid-1980s and late 1990s. 
IMF estimates the Korean privatizations to have generated 15.37 billion (1985 US dollars) in 1985-
99 (Brune, Garret and Kogut, 2004. Appendix 1). Similarly, the OECD puts the figure to 14.3 
billion USD produced between 1993 and 1999 (OECD, 2001, Recent Privatization Trends. 
Table 1. Calculations are my own). A completely different figure is offered by Paul Cook and 
Yuichiro Uchida (2001), according to whom the Korean divestments have generated a mere 
2.5 billion USD in 1988-99. In addition to these figures, the post AFC privatizations brought 
10.7 billion USD in revenue to the Korean government (Korea Knowledge Share Programme, 
2010:24). Added together, the total value of privatization proceeds from the mid-1980s to 
2002 amount to somewhere between 25 and 26 billion USD. However, the real figure is most 
likely at least somewhat higher than that due to the fact that these calculations are based on 
the figures from 1985 to 2002. 
6.2 Post-Privatization Profitability
Improving profitability of SOEs is often one of the leading causes behind privatization. 
Despite the statistical evidence pointing toward the increased profitability of SOEs through 
privatization, there is still no consensus on whether privatization actually enhances 
performance or not. Although, in general, studies indicate that private companies perform 
more efficiently than non-privatization firms, companies’ performance is however affected 
by a multitude of changing factors, for example, available technology, taxes and price 
controls. In addition to this, there is also the problem of disentangling privatization from mere 
reforms. Privatization might boost efficiency but just reforming the corporate sector might 
produce a similar effect. However, the purpose of this section is not to present evidence 
supporting one view over another but to show whether the profitability of SOEs in China, 
Japan and Korea has increased over the years after privatization or reforms.
Profitability can be measured in several ways including return on assets (ROA), return on 
investment (ROI) or return on equity (ROE) and return on sales (ROS). Some authors prefer 
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one method to another but it should not matter which method one uses as long they are not 
used interchangeably. 
6.2.1 China
According to Guohua Jiang, Heng Yue and Longkai Zhao (2009), who measured profitability 
as return on sales (ROS), the initial privatizations and reforms made in the 1980s and early 
1990s were ineffective and, in fact, resulted in worsening performance. Prior to the end of the 
1990s, Chinese privatization suffered from several problems which also posed problems to 
the Chinese economy at large. The incentive-suppressing effects affecting SOEs and 
investors willing to invest included the large amount of non-tradable shares, inexistent 
protection for investor’s rights, unreliable auditing, conflicts of interest in the board of 
directors and managers, rigid IPO quota, unindependent directors and lack of corporate 
governance. 
Coming to the end of the 1990s, these deficiencies were partly addressed by the China 
Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) which made several important improvements 
including standardized interim reports, annual reports, more transparent securities trading and 
formalization of issuance of shares and listing of new companies. Taken together, these 
reforms have had a positive effect on the Chinese stock market but, between 1999 and 2002, 
in spite of the reforms, SIP firms have undergone a deterioration of profitability. The authors 
link this to the lack of effective institutions. During this period of time, SIP firms did outdo
their state-owned counterparts but in both cases their ROS declined. Therefore, the 
performance of the SIP firms has only been less worse than firms which have not undergone 
an SIP (Jiang, Yue and Zhao, 2009).
The continuing decline of profitability has also been observed by Ligang Song and Yang Yao 
(2004) who applied a return on assets (ROA) to measure profitability. In their calculations 
which were based on data collected between 1996 and 2001, the fully state-owned companies 
made losses during the whole period. Partially privatized companies had a better rate of 
profitability than fully private companies but both their profitability was lower in 2001 than 
in 1996. (Ibid. Figure 2. Pp.29). Both studies indicate that SIPs had a positive effect on firm 
profitability. 
After the early 2000s, the reforms started fully working as intended by Beijing. Based on Gao 
Xu’s ROA calculations, profitability of both industrial private companies and SOEs started 
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improving rapidly in the early 2000s. For the SOEs, the strong growth continued until 2007, 
the onset of the global financial crisis, when their profitability started declining. The 
profitability of private companies did not decline until 2008 and, even then, the decline was 
very moderate (Xu, 2010). The ROA of SOEs rose from 0.7 to 6.3% in comparison with 4.5 
to 7.9% of private companies (OECD, 2006. Table 6.). There is however some indicators 
pointing out that the SOEs may be improving their profitability. According to Xinhua, the 
SASAC administered SOEs were able to raise their profits by 50.1% in 2010 (Xinhuanet,
2010). 
6.2.2 Japan
In Japan, the post-privatization performance has improved and competition has increased. 
Especially, NTT has been able to expand its businesses. In spite of the company’s size, NTT 
is now facing serious competition from other operators and it has lost some of its profits due 
to increased competition but NTT is still the largest company in the telecommunications 
sector. After the privatization of NTT, the data and mobile communications were separated to 
become independent companies. In addition, the company has become more customer-
oriented (Toyama, 1998). However, NTT is still only a partially privatized 
telecommunications giant whose profits have been increasing on an annual basis. In 1999, 
NTT was Japan’s most profitable company (Privatization Task Force, 2004). JT has also 
managed to raise its profitability. Despite not being a fully private company, JT was the third 
most profitable tobacco company in the world in 2009 (Japan Tobacco Inc and Japan 
Tobacco International). In similar fashion, JR has been able to improve its services although 
not as well as NTT. JR has been able to reverse its spending and start making profit again. As 
in the case of NTT, competition increased and the needs of customers were better taken into 
account (Toyama, 1998). In general, almost all JR entities have been able to improve their 
performance but not all parts have been privatized (Mizutani and Uranishi, 2006). 
6.2.3 Korea
In Korea, the company profitability improved sharply after the 1983 introduction of GIE 
Performance Evaluation System. The profits of GIEs started growing and losses shrinking 
The public profitability of the five largest GIEs improved from 13% in 1982 to 18% in 
1987(Shirley, 1989:23. Table 3. citing Korea Development Institute).  
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Regarding the effects of privatization in Korea, it is difficult to separate privatization from 
the larger context of reforms. For example, one of the reasons Korea managed to improve the 
public sector enterprise performance in the 1980s was due to the managerial reforms which 
included giving managers incentives in form of MBOs but also greater corporate autonomy 
and less political interference (Shirley and Nellis, 1991:69; Shirley, 1989).
Korea Telecom was privatized in 2002 and, as a result, the company’s ROA has improved 
but its ROS deteriorated. The profitability and efficiency have only slightly improved but 
these changes occurred in the same time period when other large companies were doing well 
(Kim, 2009). According to the Korea Knowledge Sharing Program, the reforms following the 
AFC also improved the privatized companies’ profitability (Korea Knowledge Sharing 
Program 2010 pp. 24) 
6.2.4 Conclusion
Generally speaking, East Asian SOEs have definitely become more profitable but to varying 
degrees. In China, the first privatizations and share offerings were effective to the extent that 
SOEs managed to reduce their operating losses. The late 1990s reforms were able to increase 
SOEs’ profitability to almost 7% in 2007 when measuring ROA (Xu, 2010) but since then the 
figures started shrinking due to the international financial crisis. The Japanese government 
was able to lay off workers to turn JNR to a more profitable company before public share 
offerings. Obviously in these cases, improvements in profitability cannot be attributed to 
privatization but to government rearrangements in the public enterprise sector. Meanwhile, 
the partly-privatized Japanese SOEs like NTT and JT have become global players in their 
respective fields but it is difficult to connect this development to privatization since the 
government still owns significant shares of each company. Moreover, both companies have 
enjoyed monopoly status and consequent economic benefits. Even today, both companies are 
market leaders in Japan. In Korea, a similar pattern is evident in the aftermath of KT’s 
privatization. The profitability and efficiency improved but likely due to the favorable 
external conditions and layoffs. To sum up, the privatized SOEs in East Asia have improved 
their profitability but to varying degrees and due to different causes. 
7 Findings
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First of all, the national economies of China, Japan and Korea were all different from each 
other and these structural differences were also reflected in the process of privatization, 
dimensions and methods of privatization and the causes and results of privatization. Despite 
the differences, there were also similarities regarding the process of privatization. Not 
surprisingly, the economies and, consequently, the privatization policies and practices were 
closest to each other in Korea and Japan: the low share of their SOEs of both labor and GDP, 
the large conglomerates and similar forms of PEs. SOEs as they exist in China did not exist
neither in Japan nor Korea. 
7.1.1 Importance of SOEs and Economic Development
The importance of SOEs in China, Japan and Korea before privatizations varied to a great 
extent. China had the biggest number of SOEs and their share of the GDP was also the 
highest. Also, their contribution to employment was also highest both in relative and absolute 
terms. Japan had the fewest SOEs both measured in their contribution to the GDP and 
workforce. However, the share offerings in Japan have been the most profitable, depending 
on the calculations. By this measure, China is second and Korea third due to the small size of 
its economy. In this category, Korea falls somewhere in between China and Japan. There 
were substantially more PEs in Korea than in Japan and Korean PEs’ share of GDP and labor 
was higher than in Japan but clearly lower than in China. These differences are all rather self-
evident when one takes a look at the respective economic histories of China, Japan and 
Korea. China emerged from a communist plan economy whereas Japan had industrialized 
already at the turn of the 20th century. Prior to the end of the 1980s, Korea was a military 
dictatorship recovering from the Korean War. Despite these differences in the level of 
economic development, all countries started reforming their economies and corporation
policies, albeit differently due to different economic structures but approximately at the same 
time. Early 1980s marked the beginning of corporate reforms in China (12th Central 
Committee of the CCP in 1982), Korea (the 1983 GIE Basic Management Act) and Japan 
(the Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform in 1982). The level of GDP being
radically different in all countries, this development, in my opinion, points to the changes in 
the wider international system of political economy. 
7.1.2 Timing of Privatization
When it comes to the timing of privatization, countries attempt to time the privatizations so 
that they take place during a boom season in order to maximize the market capitalization. In 
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this respect, there are clear differences between all countries. In Japan, share floatings have 
taken place both after economically viable and negative years. The timing of share floating of 
both NTT and JT failed to produce the anticipated result whereas the public offering of JR 
East proved successful in terms of the stock price despite the launch during a period of low 
growth. In Korea, the first privatizations of KEPCO, POSCO and KT&G were implemented 
after economically favorable years and the later Korean privatizations also took place during 
years of economic growth but were caused by a severe fall in the Korean economy. In China, 
the 1990s did not produce as many IPOs as the 2000s. This was probably due to decelerating 
growth until 1998 and the tight and unfavorable regulation. The consequences of these two 
conditions were solved after 1998 when the economic growth started accelerating and bans 
and excessive restrictions removed. As a result, the 2000s has seen a rapid surge in the 
number of share offerings in China. 
7.1.3 Fiscal Impetuses
When comparing the impetuses for privatization, it is clear that the fiscal distress has been 
among the key factors behind privatization. However, the strain on public finances 
manifested itself very differently in China, Japan and Korea. In China, the fiscal constraints 
had to do with the banks which had been lending cheap credit to the SOEs to the extent that 
the outstanding debt threatened the stability of the banks. The budgets of many SOEs were 
hardened by limiting the banks’ right to lend money. Related to this issue, there was also an 
objective to make SOEs more efficient and, thus, less dependent on the government and bank 
funding. In Japan, the situation for many SOEs prior to the privatization was a legal deadlock. 
On one hand, they were subjected to rigid regulations governing their production, expansion 
and monopoly status to guarantee government revenue. Furthermore, they were also used for 
purely political purposes. On the other hand, the role of SOEs as revenue had started 
declining due to their growing fiscal dependency on the government caused by their protected 
statuses. In short, the revenue gained from SOEs was decreasing in relation to their costs. 
This happened in tandem with the companies themselves unable to turn their losses into 
profits without a change in the legislation governing their market status. Until the late 1990s 
privatizations due to the AFC fiscal distress had not been a major reason behind privatization 
in Korea. Korea had suffered from common problems with SOEs but there had been no 
sudden need for their privatization. In short, PEs despite their problems had been rather 
profitable and were themselves not the reason behind privatization but the changes happening 
in their business environment.
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7.1.4 National Debt
Both in Japan and Korea, the rising levels of debt in the early 1980s were encountered with 
corporate reforms and privatizations. As a result, the growth of debt was tamed and both 
Japan and Korea went through a period of decreasing government debt. In the early 1990s, 
the Japanese government debt started growing again and the government resorted to further 
privatizations which however did not reduce the national debt further. The Korean and 
Chinese national debt began rising as a result of the AFC. In China, the privatization occurred 
due to the transfer of ownership rights from the central to the local government and bailing 
out of the state-owned banks by the central government. In Korea, the harsh privatization 
program was set up mainly to gain revenue for the state and restore the faith of international 
organizations and investors. Because of the crisis, the government debt in Japan increased as 
well. However, despite the privatization measures, the government debt in China, Japan and 
Korea continued rising. In China, the debt was temporarily reduced in 2004 and 2005 
probably due to the share conversion program. In Japan, the liabilities were also temporarily 
reduced in 2005 with the revenues gained from the privatization of the highway corporations.
7.1.5 External Influences
External influences had the least impact on the Chinese privatization but the AFC did 
increase China’s public spending and government debt which further contributed to the 
privatization of many of the state-owned SMEs. U.S. influence has been minimal and the 
AFC did not directly cause any restructuring or privatization. Similarly, Japan faced only 
minor problems due to the crisis which did not have a direct impact on the privatization.
Korea, on the contrary, was vulnerable to the economic shock of the AFC in 1997 and was 
consequently subordinated to foreign emergency loans via IMF. As a result, Korea engaged 
in an extensive series of privatizations. Both Japan and Korea had also been influenced by the 
U.S. economic pressure to liberalize their telecommunications sectors. 
7.1.6 Dimensions and Methods of Privatization
Privatization has been centralized in both Korea and Japan. China’s has applied both 
decentralized and centralized strategies to privatization. For SMEs, the approach has been 
decentralized and for larger companies the SASAC exert authority over the 119 companies. 
All the countries used privatization programs but their . Ad hoc-approach to privatization
may have been used but, based on the data selected and read for this study, no clear case of 
ad hoc approach was found. Privatization has been gradual in each country but in Korea it has 
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extended the longest time and in China the shortest time. Furthermore, privatization has also
been partial in respect to individual companies. Although both China and Korea have fully 
privatized some of their companies, the government still owns significant shares of 
companies, especially in China. Japan has fully privatized only four companies: JAL and 
three JR subsidiaries. The rest of the Japanese PEs and their subsidiaries are either partly 
privatized or fully state-owned. 
SIPs were used in each country but to a different degree. In Japan, SIP was the only 
privatization method whereas in China it was the least used method. Direct sales were used in 
both China and Korea and in China they were the most used method. In addition, China has 
also used leasing and privatization from below by removing restrictions on entering the 
market. 
7.1.7 Profitability
In general, the profitability of SOEs in East Asia has improved but it is not clear whether the 
positive effects can be linked to privatization per se or the wider corporate reforms and the 
favorable growth environment. In China, the corporate reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s
did not increase the profitability of SOEs whose performance continued declining until the 
early 2000s. However, the firms which had issued shares and thus become partially private 
did perform better than their fully state-owned counterparts but SIPs were not enough to turn 
their losses into profits. In the end of the 1990s, the declining profitability was encountered 
with a series of corporate reforms which strengthened their performance and contributed to 
their growth. The profitability of the SOEs started declining again after 2007, year before the 
private companies but, since 2010, has returned to growth. 
In Japan, the performance-enhancing effect of privatization has been more company-specific. 
In short, all three core PEs, NTT, JR and JT which are all still partly state-owned, have
improved their performance. In comparative terms, NTT has been able to improve its 
performance most through increased competition and better customer service in the 
telecommunications sector. JR was able to also raise its profitability but to a lesser extent 
while three of the six separated transportation entities still belong to the state. JT has also 
improved its performance to the extent that it has become the world’s third most profitable 
tobacco company. 
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PEs in Korea have also been improved their performance but like in China and Japan it is 
unsure whether the cause of enhanced profitability was due to privatization or other corporate 
reforms. The 1983 GIE Basic Management Act increased the profitability of the SOEs but 
entailed much less privatization than reforms.  Firm profitability also increased after the AFC 
but again the companies with increased profitability would have probably improved their 
performance even without privatization such as KT which benefited from overall growth 
environment. 
8 Conclusion
To shortly summarize this thesis, privatization is an economic policy which has had both 
similarities and differences in its causes, processes and results in East Asia. The increasing 
trend of privatization since the early 1980s points out to the redefinition of public and private 
on a global level. In East Asia, this manifested itself in the coincidental timing of the 1980s 
corporate reforms and privatizations, albeit at different levels of economic development. In 
addition to the emergence of a global political economic ideology, neoliberalism, the 
privatization and reforms were further contributed by the AFC which China, Japan and Korea 
also shared as a common external shock whose effects were however differently experienced. 
In Japan and Korea, privatization of the telecommunications sectors was influenced by the 
U.S. foreign policy to a certain extent. When measuring the post-privatization performance, 
the profitability rates have improved across East Asia but it is unclear whether this 
development is due to the economic growth in general, corporation reforms or privatization 
itself.  
The biggest differences with respect to privatization were within the initial importance of 
SOEs and the dimensions and the use of methods of privatization. The domestic structures 
shaped the dimensions and methods of privatization. In Japan, the sole method of 
privatization through SIPs probably reflected the sophisticated level of Japan’s financial 
markets and the large size of the SOEs whereas in China the variety of methods used 
reflected the transitional nature of China’s economy. In addition, China’s twin approach of 
centralized and decentralized privatization pointed out to the large amount of SOEs.
Furthermore, there were also differences within the factors themselves. For example, with 
regard to increasing profitability through corporate reforms, China’s SOEs suffered from low 
rates of profitability long after the first corporate reforms whereas the corporate reforms in 
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Korea in the 1980s clearly improved the profitability of the PEs. Fiscal distress was among 
the main reasons leading to privatization. However, the constraints on public finances 
appeared very differently. In China, the constraints originated within the nexus of state, local 
government, SOEs and banks whereas in Japan the constraints on finances derived from the 
legal restrictions on SOEs.  On the contrary, financial distress has not been the sole reason to 
privatize with the exception of the post-AFC privatization. 
Having addressed and discussed some of the similarities and differences in the causes, 
processes and results of privatization, this paper also raised some more questions. The roots 
of modern privatization lay in the transformation of the political economic ideology in the 
world’s leading economies in the 1970s and1980s but this thesis did not cover the origin of 
the emergence of neoliberalism. What caused this transformation or to what deeper causes 
can the rise of neoliberal policies be traced? The oil crises, continuation of Keynesian 
economic policies and stagflation are often mentioned as examples leading to the change in 
the economic political ideology. However, there is one macroeconomic factor which is often 
overlooked when discussing the origins of neoliberal policies: falling ratio of profit-to-
investments rate. In the U.S., this ratio had been declining since the Second World War until 
the early 1980s when it started growing again. Although the connection between the ratio 
and, for example, stagflation is completely unclear, these two phenomena coincided in the 
end of the 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, it is also unclear how economic reforms and 
privatizations restored the ratio’s growth which continued until.
One area ignored by this paper was the deeper relationship between economic reforms and 
privatization. Privatization is only one form of a larger set of economic reforms. China, Japan 
and South Korea have all engaged in reforming their SOEs through redefining their roles, 
tasks and relationship with the government but, as noted before, economic reforms do not 
mandate privatization. Privatization is only a policy choice of economic reforms. Under 
average circumstances, increased profitability and efficiency can be achieved with other 
means than privatization of SOEs. Also not covered by this study were the differences 
between partially privatized and fully state-owned companies.
This thesis had other shortcomings as well. The focus was on the comparison of privatization 
between nations. A more consistent study would have concentrated on a particular economic 
sector like state-owned banks between more similar economies. However, because East Asia 
is an economically diverse region with only few nations, regional comparisons have to 
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include at least the three biggest economies: China, Japan and Korea. An even more specific 
study could have concentrated on comparing privatization in Japan and Korea but this 
approach would not have suited my China-oriented studies. Although the results would have 
been more comparable and consistent between more similar economies, there have been 
major differences between more homogenous countries as well, for example in Western 
Europe. 
To sum up, privatization, especially how but also with what methods it is carried out, reflects 
the structures of domestic economies, e.g. the number and size of SOEs, development of 
financial markets and internal political and economic fragmentation. But privatization is 
however more than just domestic policies. In the world’s economic system, privatization and 
economic reforms also have their international character which contributes to the causes and 
process of privatization. Apart from just foreign policies in defense of national economic 
interests, countries are financially and monetarily more intertwined than ever which means 
that external economic shocks can severely undermine a nation’s economy forcing it to 
privatize. Moreover, as many partially privatized companies listed in the stock exchanges are 
counted as some of the world’s biggest companies, the states are not only major stakeholders 
but, through this mechanism, their assets have also become more vulnerable to financial 
instabilities and international investors. Thus, causes of privatization in form of national debt 
and business cycles thus take a very ambiguous role where both the domestic and external 
structures and actors play their part.
9 Abbreviations
AFC Asian Financial Crisis
GBE Government-Backed Enterprise
GE Government Enterprise
GIE Government-Invested Enterprise
IIE Indirectly Invested Enterprise
IPO Initial Public Offering
JAL Japan Airlines
JR Japan Railways
JNR Japan National Railways
JTSPC Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation
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JT Japan Tobacco
KT Korea Telecom
KTG Korea Tobacco and Ginseng Corporation
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
NTT Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
PCAR Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform
PE Public enterprise
RHSOS Reduction of holding of State-Owned Shares
SAC State asset commission
SIP Share issue privatization
SOE State-owned Enterprise
TVE Township and Village Enterprise
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Abstract
Privatization is any process where the state either partially or wholly reduces or transfers its 
assets to private actors. Privatization can be centralized, decentralized, rapid or gradual or it 
can be conducted through a privatization program or in an improvised, ad hoc-manner. The 
most common privatization methods include share issue privatization, direct sale, leasing and
privatization from below. Privatization can have multiple causes and the ones examined in 
this paper include the level of economic development, business cycles, fiscal constraints, 
national debt and external influences.  The outcomes of privatization are viewed in the light 
of profitability whose improvement is often one of the main objectives of privatization. 
Privatization has become an international political economic trend. Based on the level of 
GDP per capita, privatization was initiated at a somewhat different time in Japan than in 
Korea or China which both started privatizing as low-income economies. Japan started the 
privatization of its SOEs in the 1980s when it was already a developed economy.
Dire state of public finances, like elsewhere, was among the leading causes of privatization in 
East Asia. However, the financial troubles manifested themselves very differently. In China, 
the constraints originated within the nexus of state, local government, SOEs and banks 
whereas in Japan the constraints on finances derived from the legal restrictions on SOEs.  On 
the contrary, in Korea, financial distress has not been the sole reason to privatize with the 
exception of the post-AFC privatization. The rising levels of national debt in the 1980s were 
encountered with corporation reforms and privatizations in Japan and Korea. The early 1990s 
privatization in Japan also followed increasing national debt but the privatization of JR and 
JT did not have a decreasing effect on indebting. During the AFC and rapidly rising levels of 
debt, Korea and China embarked on privatizing but Japan did not.
In Japan, share floatings have taken place both after economically viable and negative years. 
The timing of share floating of both NTT and JT failed to produce the anticipated result 
whereas the public offering of JR East proved successful. In Korea, the first privatizations of 
KEPCO, POSCO and KT&G were implemented after economically favorable years and the 
later Korean privatizations also took place during years of economic growth but were caused 
by a severe contraction of the Korean economy. In China, the 1990s did not produce as many 
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IPOs as the 2000s. This was probably due to decelerating growth until 1998 and the tight and 
unfavorable regulation. 
Privatization in East Asia has also been affected to a certain extent by external factors. The 
Asian financial crisis affected all countries but their degree of vulnerability to the crisis 
varied. The U.S. foreign policy has also played a minor role in the privatization of the 
telecommunications sector in Japan and Korea but not in China.  
Privatization programs were used in each country and the general trend has been gradual 
privatization except in China and Korea in the 1990s when a large number of SOEs were 
rapidly privatized. Privatization was also centrally directed except in China where 
decentralized privatization was applied to SMEs. China has applied various privatization 
methods including share issue privatization, direct sale, leasing and privatization from below. 
Japan has predominantly relied on the use of share issue privatization. In Korea, direct sales 
and SIPs have been the most used methods. 
Profitability of SOEs has been improving but it is unclear whether this is due to privatization 
itself, wider corporate reforms or general economic growth. The initial reforms of the 1980s 
worsened the performance of Chinese SOEs but the profitability rates started improving in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s due to deepening reforms. In Japan, all major three public 
enterprises improved their profitability after privatization and reforms. In Korea, public 
enterprises improved their performance more due to reforms than privatization in the 1980s. 
Abstrakt
Privatisierung bezeichnet jeden Prozess, in dem der Staat abgestuft oder gänzlich das 
öffentliche Vermögen zu privaten Tätern übergibt. Privatisierung kann zentralisiert, 
dezentralisiert, abgestuft oder schnell, durch ein Privatisierungsprogramm oder spontan (ad 
hoc) ausgeführt werden. Die üblichsten Privatisierungsarten sind Privatisierung durch 
Aktienausgabe (share issue privatization), direkter Verkauf an Investoren (direct sale), 
Leasing und Privatisierung von unten. Privatisierung kann verschiedene Gründe haben: 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Konjunkturzyklen, fiskalische Belastung, Verschuldung und 
externe Gründe, z.B. Aussenpolitik oder wirtschaftliche Krise. 
Privatisierung ist ein international wirtschaftpolitischer Trend geworden. Basierend auf dem 
BIP pro Kopf hat Privatisierung zu unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Ebenen begonnen. 
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China und Korea waren beide einkommenschwache Länder aber Japan war ein ertragsstarkes 
Land.  
Die Fiskale Belastung war, wie auch in anderen Ländern, der hauptsächliche Grund hinter 
den Privatisierungentscheidungen in Ostasien. Aus der Sicht der Privatisierung, hat der Druck 
auf öffentliche Finanzen aber unterschiedlich in jedem Land bekanntgemacht. In China hat 
sich der Privatisierungsdruck in der Verknüpfung des Staates, Banken und lokalen 
Regierungen entwickelt. In Japan entstand Privatisierung aus den rechtlichen 
Beschränkungen auf staatliche Unternehmen. Im Gegenteil zu der Privatisierung in China 
und Japan war die finanzielle Notlage nicht der wichtigste Grund hinter der Privatisierung, 
mit der Ausnahme von der Asienkrise. Die steigende Staatsverschuldung in den 1980er 
Jahren wurde in Japan und Korea mit Korporationsreformen begegnet. Wegen der Asienkrise 
und schnell steigender Staatsverschuldung wurden viele staatliche Unternehmen in China und 
Korea privatisiert aber in Japan nicht.  
In Japan wurde sowohl in wirtschaftlich guten als auch schlechten Jahren privatisiert. Die 
Aktienausgaben von NTT und JT waren nicht so erfolgreich wie erwartet aber die 
Aktienausgabe von JR East hat sich bewährt. In Korea wurden die ersten Privatisierungen
von KEPCO, POSCO und KT & G nach wirtschaftlich günstigen Jahren umgesetzt. Die 
späteren koreanischen Privatisierungen wurden von der Asienkrise verursacht. In China
haben die 1990er Jahre nicht so viele Börsengänge wie die 2000er Jahre produziert. Dies war 
wahrscheinlich aufgrund von gedämpften Wachstums und engen und ungünstigen
Regelungen.
Privatisierung in Ostasien wurde auch von externen Faktoren beeinflusst. Die Asienkrise im 
1997 beeinflusste Privatisierung jedes Landes aber in verschiedenem Masse. Besonders 
betroffen war Korea. Die amerikanische Aussenpolitik hat auch Einfluss auf Privatisierung in 
Japan und Korea gehabt besonders in dem Telekommunikationssektor. 
Privatisierungsprogramme wurden in allen drei Ländern verwendet und die Privatisierung 
war generell in allen drei Ländern graduell, mit der Ausnahme von den Privatisierungen am 
ende der 1990er in China und Korea. Privatisierung war generell auch zentralisiert ausser in 
China, wo die Privatisierung der kleinen und mittleren Unternehmen dezentralisiert 
ausgeführt wurde. China hat auch unterschiedliche Privatisierungsmethode verwendet. 
Dahingegen hat Japan nur durch die Aktienausgabe privatiziert. Korea hat hauptsächlich 
direkten Verkauf und Aktienausgabe als Privatisierungsmethode verwendet. 
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Im zeitlichen Vergleich hat sich die Rentabilität öffentlicher Unternehmen in Ostasien 
durchschnittlich verbessert aber es ist unklar, wieviel Einfluss Privatisierung darauf gehabt 
hat im Vergleich mit anderen Faktoren, z.B. generelle Wirtschaftsreforme und -wachstum. 
Aufgrund der ersten Reforme in China ist die Rentabilität nachgelassen und hat sich erst 
wieder am ende der 90er Jahre verbessert. In Japan hat sich die Rentabilität der drei grössten 
Unternehmen nach Privatisierungen deutlich verbessert. In Korea haben die Reforme mehr 
Einfluss auf die Rentabilität der grossen Staatsunternehmen gehabt als Privatisierung.   
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